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Copper is the mainstay of the Zambian economy. From the inception of mining activities in the 
1920s, it has accounted for the majority of the country‟s exports and foreign earnings. However, 
most people are of the view that its contribution to development programmes is disproportionate, 
well below their expectations. They attribute the contemporary failure to copper price volatility, 
international market forces, ownership, government ineptitude and the consequences of 
neoliberalism. Given the large expense involved in establishing and running copper mines, the 
country depends heavily on foreign capital. A big proportion of the copper that is mined in 
Zambia is sold in an unprocessed state denying the country additional revenue. This study 
assesses both the role of copper mining in the economic history of Zambia and its role in 
contemporary development as perceived and understood by current university-educated job 
market entrants on the Zambian Copperbelt, their educators and other commentators with work 
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From the time I‟ve spent in Kalulushi, and that‟s a long time, which is 15-18 
years, I would say mining, particularly copper mining, and to some extent 
agriculture, drive the economy of Kalulushi, and in fact the whole Zambia. Before 
the mines collapsed, I was in Kalulushi, that was 98, in fact, 95 up to 98. At the 
time everyone moved to agriculture growing things like vegetables, maize crops. 
That‟s what was sustaining the people of Kalulushi. Those that had money, if say 
they got a good retrenchment package, took up poultry and beef farming, milk 
production, but most people grew vegetables in their backyards. This was around 
1995 – 2000, which was also the beginning of privatisation. It‟s only when new 
companies like Metorex came in, that things started changing and people started 
going to look for jobs again. This was not everyone, although I would say the 
majority, even though, even at its worst we still had people that were still working 
in the mines who I would say were still contributing to the overall economy. 
During the time when things were really bad, it was mostly agriculture that 
sustained us. Around here most people work in Chambishi or Chibuluma mine 
which is now run by new investors so when the mines are not doing well 
everything is affected. (Interview with Muyunda, 18
th
  December, 2011) 
At the time of the interview Muyunda was a 24 year old man in his final year of study at the 
Zambia Catholic University in Kalulushi. He was born in Chingola in the Copperbelt Province, 
northern Zambia near the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo and less than 80 miles 
from Kalulushi where he currently lives with his parents. Muyunda‟s parents are both retired. His 
mother worked as teacher and his father was a senior employee in the mines for most of his 
working career, first as an assistant superintendent and later as a superintendent under the mining 
conglomerate Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). Muyunda‟s father, a chemical 
engineer by training, was retrenched in 1998 in a restructuring exercise after Zambia privatised 
its mines, and as new investors took up operations. This thesis explores what the impact of this 
restructuring has been on local people, and how this has shaped, in particular, the attitudes and 
perceptions of a group of university students. Central to the dissertation, will be an interrogation 
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of how capital, ownership, market factors, and property rights, have determined the relationship 
between mining, host countries and local communities, and how these factors determine the 
perceived role mining plays in development. In order to do this, I will sketch a historical 
overview of mining in developing regions around the world with a special focus on Zambia 
before outlining the views of students and workers on the Copperbelt.  For those about to embark 
on their working lives, the opportunities that mining might have to offer them and the 
development of the country are of acute and immediate concern.   
Like all urban towns on the Copperbelt, Chingola and Kalulushi, that Muyunda refers to in the 
interview extract above, are company towns that were created with the discovery and subsequent 
exploitation of abundant copper reserves in the 1920s. This led to mining companies embarking 
on a massive social, cultural, and economic engineering project, reshaping indigenous societies 
to establish conditions necessary for capitalism to thrive and ensure easy access to Zambia‟s 
copper. In this paper, my primary focus will be on the town of Kalulushi. This town is important 
in the history of copper mining in Zambia, eulogised for producing the best grade copper among 
all mining towns on the Copperbelt. According to Nyambe and Kawamya, the mines around 
Kalulushi produces the world‟s highest-grade copper at more than 8% copper (2005:81). At 
present the town has two large-scale operational copper mines, Chibuluma West, a new open pit 
mine, and Chambishi, an underground mine. Two other mines closed down. Two shaft in the 
1990s at the beginning of the privatisation process, and Seven shaft around 2008.  
In 1998 a Chinese company, Non-Ferrous Company (NFC), invested in Chambishi and has 
operated the mine since then. The story is quite different for Chibuluma mine. This mine was 
first sold to the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and Metorex of South Africa, and at 
the apex of the 2008 global recession, and as copper prices tumbled, IDC and Metorex 
disinvested. The mine was then sold to NFC. Such changes of ownership are not new to the 
Zambian copper mining industry. From the very beginning, investment in copper mines has 
flowed in and out of the region. This could be attributed to a number of factors from government 
policy to investor decisions. At present, the strong copper prices and the recent boom in China, 
India and Brazil especially, have led to more and more companies from these countries exploring 
the area for viable investment opportunities. 
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As Muyunda observed, people‟s livelihoods in Kalulushi are closely tied to copper mining. Thus 
the decline of the industry in the 1980s and 1990s negatively impacted on livelihoods, leading to 
massive unemployment and hardships in communities. Growing up in Kalulushi, I would support 
Muyunda‟s assertion, that a notable change of attitude in how some people within Kalulushi and 
across the country interacted with the mines, was apparent after this. Both the political and 
economic landscape became dominated by debates around how to fix the underperforming 
mining sector and broader economy. In order to counter the problems created as a consequence, 
and given Zambia‟s heavy reliance on copper, there was a strong move by the government, a 
move architected by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to embark on a 
massive economic restructuring programme. According to these organisations, market friendly 
policies were imperative for Zambia to attract investment and resuscitate the mining sector and 
the overall economy. These policies became popularly known as Structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs). The main purpose of SAPs, it was argued, was removing state interference in the 
economy and relaxing the rules of trade so that capital could flow more freely. In retrospect, this 
meant reverting to the early period of copper mining when mines were dominated by foreign 
multinational companies (MNCs). Before I go into great detail as to how SAPs came to affect 
Zambian society, it is important to note that, from inception, Zambia‟s copper mines have been 
dominated by MNCs who, upon making agreements (arguably fraudulent, see Simutanyi, 2008) 
with the British South African Company (BSAC) and local chiefs, obtained concessionary rights 
to exploit mineral deposits. Not only did they – as in much of the developing world - establish a 
system of racial superiority, they also enjoyed privileges of private ownership (Ferguson, 1999). 
As a result, copper mining has always been influenced strongly by the dictates of capital and the 
market. 
Nearly a century since the inception of mining and interest from foreign investors, interaction 
with the market and respect for property rights have again become central to questions of how 
countries like Zambia can increase trade, attract investment, reap sufficient rewards from their 
resources and distribute them equitably - in short, ensuring development. Unlike in the 1920s, 
these ideas have assumed „sanctity‟ as they have found support in powerful and influential 
organisations such as the international financial institutions (IFIs) mentioned above. At the 
centre of renewed calls for a new full integration with the market is the idea that if past 
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experiences with the market had not helped Zambia develop, present circumstances, helped by 
Zambia‟s membership of the global village, would. This should bring together the holy trinity of 
the market, property rights and foreign direct investment (Bush, 2010:238). IFIs not only support 
these measures, but have re-emphasised their commitment to developing countries by facilitating 
the extractive industries‟ contribution to poverty alleviation and economic growth through the 
promotion of good governance and sustainable development‟ (Bush, 2010:256). But in order for 
all this to work countries need to be members of the global village and embrace neoliberalism. 
Globalisation and neoliberalism have both been premised on the idea that, more than ever before, 
developing countries like Zambia would be best advised to be open to trade with other countries 
with renewed vigour. However, sceptics of these processes have argued that as the initial 
rationale by those who advanced market fundamentalism was the developing world‟s debt, this 
was a self-serving exercise to ensure debts were repaid. Others have even gone as far as to claim 
that this new project of globalisation has simply been about freeing those in the developing 
world of their „natural and cultural‟ identity (Nyamnjoh, 2000:5). Such voices are unanimous in 
blaming the market for increased levels of poverty and inequality. For example, Bush (2007) has 
argued that those who advocate for the market ignore its failures and its potential to hamper 
prosperity. He charts the way capital and markets have had uneven effects into Africa arguing 
that, „it is not that markets are good or bad, but that some countries or regions have the power to 
make world markets work for their advantage, while others do not, and have to bear the cost‟ 
(2007:42). 
Professor Jeffrey Sachs was an advisor to developing countries and played a role overseeing the 
transition of some communist Eastern European states into market integration after the Cold War 
ended. Sachs (2005:356) mocks the view that is often put forward by pessimists of globalisation 
and the market, which is that multinational corporations „are the main villains in causing extreme 
poverty and environmental degradation‟. According to him, „Africa‟s problems are not caused by 
the exploitation by global investors but rather by its economic isolation, its status as a continent 
largely bypassed by the forces of globalisation‟ (Sachs, 2005:356). This analysis is interesting in 
the context of Zambia. Given what has been noted about the influx of merchant capitalists on the 
discovery of copper, to what extent can one say that the country has been bypassed by forces of 
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globalisation, forces many of which may be seen as synonymous with capitalism? Other views 
are more circumspect, arguing that, though perhaps not bypassed, it is the way developing 
regions have integrated into the global world that has been problematic. For Ferguson (2007:38) 
and others, integration has not been homogenous. According to him capital does not flow from 
one part of the world to another uniformly. In his words, „capital is globe-hopping, not globe 
covering…. it hops, neatly skipping over most of what lies in between‟. In the case of Zambia he 
argues that if copper has linked Zambia to the global arena, it has also delinked it and, more than 
this, it has been a symbol of the „myth‟ of modernity and development (1999; 2007). Despite his 
scepticism, Ferguson contends that „the copper wire bars produced by Zambian refineries 
literally did connect the world, via telephone and power cables ….  and electrification has 
provided the twentieth century with perhaps its most vivid symbol of modernisation and 
development‟ (1999:242). But for most Zambians the difficulty has been that, when the copper 
industry has gone down, so too has the entire Zambian economy. This has once again brought 
into centre stage debates about ownership and calls by locals for increased state participation as a 
way to ensure a larger share of the cake going to Zambians. 
Given Bush‟s „uneven effects‟ argument, can globalisation and neoliberalism help Zambia 
develop, and to what extent is it possible to have a more equitable distribution of resources, 
between people within the Zambian society, and between Zambia and investment countries, 
given the country‟s dependence on foreign capital and its weak position in the market? Mining 
companies have become so powerful that sometimes they are even able to evade the control of, 
and manipulate, internal regulatory bodies (Bracking, forthcoming). The secrecy surrounding 
revenues from mining is one example. More than anything, it is the companies‟ close 
collaboration with IFIs that have ruffled a lot of feathers. Some observers, have criticised their 
market-friendly policies that were initially supposed to fight poverty and accelerate the rate of 
development for actually worsening it (Bush, 2007). For example, one of the consequences of 
the IFIs engineered SAPs on Zambian society has been an abrupt end to the welfare programmes 
that had been started after independence, some of which had important benefits to society 
(Mususa, 2010). At present the Zambian government cannot actively participate in job creation 
or supporting educational programmes as they had done before the market reforms. The most 
vulnerable have been the poor and young people like Muyunda above. A group of women and 
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young people at an illegal dump site, interviewed by Mususa (2010), bemoaned, that mines are 
likely to „employ abapwa umulopa mumishipa‟ which literally means, „those who have no blood 
running in their veins‟, a reference „to the perception that mines seem to only employ people 
who are old, have been overworked and should have been retired‟(2010:197). 
Although I could not find unemployment figures specific to youth, the table below demonstrates 
that from the late 1990s, by which time most of the mining companies had been privatised, the 
mines employed far fewer people than during the period of nationalisation between 1972 and 
1991. Hansen (2005) echoes this point, by noting that SAPs, and neoliberal market policies, have 
reduced the number of people in wage employment. Most importantly copper mining in Zambia 
does not just create direct employment. It is a significant source of wealth to support the 
development of other industrial sectors. Green argues that each job in the mining sector is able to 
support 20 others in services, the supply chain and the wider informal economy (2009:2). 
However, despite many attempts at diversification, no substitute to replace the dependence on 
copper has been found. Hence, the sector continues to be the biggest employer in the country. 
Table 1. 
Trends in mining employment 1976-2006  









 Source: Simutanyi (2008) 
Some critics argue that developing countries should revert back to having more state 
involvement in economic affairs. Harvey (2010:240) recommends „progressive taxation 
arrangements‟ while basic needs such as, education, healthcare, housing, employment and 
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perhaps environmental and developmental concerns should be provided by the state. For some 
years various critics, scholars, and political parties within and outside Zambia have argued for 
some of Harvey‟s recommendations (Langmead and Baker, 2006). They have called for an 
egalitarian tax system similar to the one applied in other developed parts of the world. But these 
are often met with counter- arguments by IFIs. Thus debates continue to rage over institutional 
restructuring both in government and in how mines are run.  Other suggestions that have been 
made include banning the exportation of raw copper in order to ensure that refinement happens 
before it is exported, and renegotiating development agreements. 
1.1. Objectives and key questions 
The objective of this study is to, 
i. Highlight the perceptions of a group of university-educated young men and women and 
key informants among workers and management in the mining industry  regarding the 
past, present and future roles of mining in development,  
ii. Examine the nature of the relationships between copper mines and communities. 
The research questions will aim to interrogate how copper mining affects people‟s livelihoods. 
Questions include:  
i. What role copper has played in participants‟ lives 
ii.  What role they imagine it might continue to play in the future 
iii. Whether copper mining benefits a cross-section of the Zambian society and the economy 
iv. How questions of ownership of mines affects all these issues. 
This thesis consists of five chapters. The literature review is divided into two chapters, chapters 
two and three. The first part of the literature review describes the impact of mining on 
development across different societies with a strong emphasis on the developing world. It 
considers mining‟s impact on livelihoods and employment, economic growth and foreign 
exchange, infrastructure development and the environment. The second part reviews the 
8 
 
evolution of mining in Zambia from inception in the late 1920s to the recent past. Both literature 
review chapters interrogate the role that capital, markets and property rights have played and 
how these factors have directed mining‟s contribution to development. Chapter four discusses 
the methods used to answer the research questions. Chapter five presents results and discussions 
about the perceptions and attitudes of youth and other key informants on mining and 
























2. Mining and development: Impacts of mining on development 
2.1. Literature review 
This literature review is divided into two chapters. The first part will consider the impact of large 
scale mining as a driver of development giving examples of different regions around the world. It 
will focus on the themes of livelihood and employment, growth and foreign exchange, 
infrastructure and social investments, and the environment. The second part (chapter three) will 
discuss the evolution of copper mining in Zambia from inception in the 1920s to the recent past.  
Concepts of political ecology assumed centre stage world over in the 1970s „as a response to the 
theoretical need to integrate land use practice‟ with the „development‟ of a „local-global political 
economy‟ (Peet and Watts, 2004:4 citing Wolf, 1972). In line with the theme of this dissertation 
and central to it, is the constantly shifting and unequal dialectic between different tiers of 
„society and land based resources‟ (Peet and Watts, 2004:3 citing Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). 
The resources in question are mineral resources. This chapter traces the dynamics and the 
movement of mineral resources, capital, those that own the means of production and those that 
depend on it to support their livelihoods. Bebbington et al describe the relationship between 
large-scale mining and development as „contentious and ambiguous‟ (2008:3). To them, and 
others, (see Hogenboom, 2012), mining is „contentious‟ because it „has so often delivered 
adverse social, environment and economic effects for the many but only significant gains for the 
few‟, and „ambiguous‟, „because of the abiding sense, among local populations as much as 
development professionals, that just maybe mining could contribute much more‟ (Bebbington et 
al. 2008:3).  
Mining has been the engine of economic development in many parts of the world. This is due to 
a number of reasons: First, economic growth over the last century throughout the world has 
created an insatiable appetite for developing countries‟ mineral resources. In turn, growth in 
exporting regions has largely been related to meeting global demand for minerals. Second, unlike 
the developed world, the developing world continues to face numerous challenges in its 
economic diversification attempts. The failure to strengthen other economic sectors and the 
perceived difficulty of extracting and accumulating capital in other sectors like tourism, 
agriculture, trade and industry makes mining the most relied upon source of capital 
10 
 
(Breckenridge, 2008). Singh (2012) notes the ease, certainty and dependability of obtaining 
capital from mining in the developing world, claiming, unlike other sectors, „natural resource 
wealth does not need to be produced but only extracted‟ (Singh, 2012:247). Despite its supposed 
importance, it is the impact of mining on local communities as Bebbington et al (2008) have 
noted above, that is highly contestable. 
However, the impact of mining on countries across the world is varied. This often depends on 
whether a country is „developed‟ or „developing‟. Most rich developed countries have stronger 
institutional and regulatory frameworks that allow them to bargain with investors on a more 
equal footing compared to developing countries. And because the structures of their economies 
tend to be more diversified, they are less dependent on mineral resources. As such, critics have 
argued that investors have tended to pay more attention to the needs of communities of rich 
countries than those of poor countries (Kapelus, 2002). 
In the developing world, mining companies possess more power than they do in the developed 
world (Bracking, forthcoming). The technological and heavy capital investment that large-scale 
mining requires – which many developing countries may not possess - and the inception 
conditions of mining projects gives foreign investors certain powers and rights (Chitonge, 2010). 
In his discussion of African economies‟ dependence on minerals, Breckenridge (2008:7) argues 
that it is because mineral resources have been treated as a „special form of property right‟, which 
consists of „the centrality of an uncontested property right (or concession or license) to the 
profitability of investment‟ that has given foreign investors in Africa the most extraordinary 
freedom to make vast profits often with little or no regard for the local communities. Echoing 
these sentiments, Singh notes that in order to bring in investment, foreign companies coerced 
Brazil and Chile to create „legislation instituting private property rights through concessions in 
explorations and exploitation‟, implement laws with the sole aim of attracting investment, and 
reduce the dominance of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in the economy (2012:236).  
Evidence from history reveals that the expansion of large scale mining went hand in hand with 
colonialism (Kapelus, 2002). Therefore, one could argue that the idea behind the obsession with 
respect for property rights is a continuation of the colonial legacy of exploitative relations. This 
is certainly the case if one considers the working of modern capitalism in developing countries, 
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the main concern of which has been protecting interests of investors rather than those living 
nearby in host countries. Furthermore, if compounded with another colonial legacy of highly 
uncertain markets, investments made tend to be highly „uneven over time‟ and prices „strongly 
procyclical at both the local and global levels‟ (Adam and Simpasa, 2010:60). Also capital 
always aims to maximise profits. As such, mining companies can go to any extent to ensure this 
happens. For example, the African independence decade of the 1960s which saw the beginning 
of a wave of Africanisation and nationalisation was met with a reaction from corporations that 
saw a rise of a new type of investment in enclave mining. This became entrenched in Africa in 
the 1980s. The consequence of this was a previously unseen isolation of the development of 
mineral resources from the wider economy and society (Breckenridge, 2008:6).  
Writers such as Sachs (2005) and Collier (2008) have argued that Africa‟s topography, 
ineffective governments, economic structures and policy problems, among other things, hamper 
broader development in the region. Despite the difficulty that this may present for mining driven 
development, availability of technology from industrialised countries means that it is possible to 
alter physical and natural features to make even the most difficult extraction possible. Hence, 
critics strongly point to the interaction of human, social and economic aspects to explain the 
problems of resource driven development. These critics have identified the existence of a 
„resource curse‟ (a highly contestable term, see Stevens, 2003) to explain the relationship 
between the lack of development and resource dependence that is apparent in most resource-rich 
developing countries. 
By closely examining the trajectory of mining in Africa and some of the factors this thesis 
mentioned, I would agree with some critics who point to pre-existing institutions embedded in 
colonialism for mining‟s poor economic and political performance and lack of tangible benefits 
accruing to local people (see Bebbington et al. 2008). Decisions regarding the wider operation of 
the mines have been made by financiers and completely divorced from the locals. Aside from 
colonial institutions and corporations, in the recent past, IFIs have increasingly collaborated with 
capital. Together with donor governments who at most times are a source of investment, IFIs 
wield a lot of influence in the economic decisions of many African states (Bracking, 
forthcoming). These factors, in one way or the other, impact on each of the dimensions that I am 
12 
 
going to discuss below. These are: livelihoods and employment; economic growth and foreign 
exchange; infrastructure and social investments, and environment. 
2.2. Impact of mines 
There are several dimensions through which mining might have developmental impacts on 
communities. These include its impact on: livelihoods and as a source of employment, on the 
economy and a source of foreign exchange, infrastructure and social consequences of mining 
investments, the environment, as well as consequences of extraction of mineral resources. 
2.2.1. Livelihoods and Employment 
On a broad level Scoones (2009) argues that a livelihood perspective is concerned with 
understanding things from a local position within the global context. Scoones notes that 
livelihood is „a mobile and flexible term‟ that could be used to describe whole fields of 
development inquiry and practice (2009:172). He argues that the starting point for a livelihood 
analysis is a consideration of „how different people in different places live‟ (2009:172). 
According to Scoones, livelihoods transcend different aspects of life such as regions (rural or 
urban) or occupations (related to work), among other things. He cites two possible 
conceptualisations of livelihoods: one used by Chambers (1995), where livelihoods are defined 
as, „the means of gaining a living‟; the other defined by the Glossary for Distance Learning 
Guide which describes livelihoods as „a combination of the resources used and activities taken in 
order to live‟ (2009:172).  
The first impact of mining on livelihoods occurs at the beginning of a mining project when, in 
order to set up a mine, people may be resettled. This means that existing small scale mining 
projects are displaced, grazing land is lost and competition for water and energy needs increases. 
Furthermore, existing businesses disappear as more people seek work in the mines and 
communities suffer the nuisance of noisy and dusty trucks (Bebbington et al. 2008). 
Despite this, mining has the potential to benefit society as a whole, owners of the mines, and 
local communities. For the communities around mines mining can be a source of direct 
employment provided by the actual activity of mining and for the country as a whole, mining can 
be a source of indirect employment resulting from other economic activities generated by the 
mines. The value chain of mining involves a diverse range of activities from exploration and 
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actual mining, to processing, adding value to the minerals mined (although in limited 
circumstances in developing countries) and distribution and consumption. Within this, there are 
also companies that supply products such as machinery, equipment and services to mining 
companies. Each of these processes has the potential to create a number of jobs.  
However, Singh (2012) argues that mining‟s enclave character restricts the skills that it can 
create. He is of the view that that since natural resource wealth is extracted not produced, when 
extraction occurs in isolation from other sectors, „workers do not get trained with transferable 
skills that allow them to move from extractive to productive sectors‟ (2012:247). 
More than this, the ability of mines to create jobs has been limited by the fact that decisions 
regarding operations are made by the owners, for whom, profits often outweigh any other 
considerations. The consequences of this on labour are that throughout the world, and especially 
in the developing world, mining has been „associated with appalling labour conditions‟ 
(Bebbington et al. 2008:3). And, in the specific context of Southern Africa, mining has been 
associated with „whole regional economies organised around political and territorialising 
instruments designed to keep labour cheap and controllable‟ (Bebbington et al. 2008:3). For 
capital, Breckenridge argues, mining worked better „under the political economy of the colonial 
rule‟ as its „labour demands synchronised much better with the politics of indirect rule‟ 
(2008:16). As such, throughout history the interests of capital have often been at odds with local 
people‟s needs for jobs and improved welfare. 
The relationship between labour and capital in many parts of the developing world has evolved 
from colonialism to neoliberalism. Before independence, most African workers were conscripted 
to work in the mines often against their will. In the South African gold mines, Breckenridge 
notes that corporations at the time „exercised an almost uncontested economic and political 
domination over the 400, 000‟ workers who worked in the mines (2008:10). He further notes that 
„African workers were locked into the least organised and skilled jobs‟ as most skilled jobs were 
kept for white workers (2008:10). Singh (2012) argues that in the recent past power dynamics 
have continued to hold. He contends that countries‟ labour management and relationships of 
various stakeholders have been influenced by the dynamics of power between companies, the 
state and organised labour, and that companies have reigned supreme (2012:247). He also argues 
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that neoliberalism has institutionalised labour flexibility, but rather than offering more job 
opportunities to local people, companies have used this as a mechanism to subcontract most jobs 
(Singh, 2012:247). Subcontracting jobs means that companies are shielded from undertaking 
direct responsibility for workers.  
Neoliberal labour and institutional flexibility have also led to companies employing many 
foreign workers who, they argue, possess special expertise. The value chain that could create 
more jobs is truncated as most companies import machinery and tools from industrialised 
countries and adding value to minerals occurs abroad. Where jobs are scarce locally, each full 
time job in the mine or in the value chain could support a number of people. Hence, exporting 
jobs abroad denies local people and their family networks of a source of livelihood. Singh 
contends that by 1980 the Chilean Corporacion Nacional del Cobre (CODELCO) a state owned 
mining company was just beginning to use third party services, but the situation drastically 
changed after privatisation of the 1990s. From then on, investors in the main mining firms 
significantly reduced the number of permanent workers and subcontracted most of the jobs 
(2012:248). This, they claimed, was in order to reduce costs, modernise companies and be 
technologically advanced so as to continue operating and contributing to national development 
(2012:248). However, a recent study by the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) 
argued that although mining creates fewer jobs compared to other industries - less than 1.5 per 
cent of national employment in many cases - most large mining companies pay better compared 
to the national average wage (2012:6).  
2.2.2. Economic growth and foreign exchange 
At certain historical moments mining has been an important source of economic growth and 
foreign exchange in many countries. Besides this, it has had the capacity to stimulate non-mining 
economic activities. However, this has depended upon the movement of capital, the distribution 
of mining revenues and the factors that affect it. The industrial revolution and the subsequent 
growth in Europe and America that catapulted these regions into development were fuelled by 
mineral resources such as coal and iron ore. Some people have wondered why mineral resources 
in the developing world have not had the same impetus in sustaining growth and generating other 
economic sectors. Some note, however, that Europe and America were not rentiers that solely 
lived off their resources but rather, they managed to diversify from early on, using the window of 
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opportunity provided by mineral resources to build a more sustainable industrial base such as 
viable steel and textile industries (Sachs and Warner, 1997). 
The problem for the developing world has not always been a lack of growth, but a lack of 
sufficient growth that could translate into sustainable gains. A survey conducted by Sachs and 
Warner (1997) of 95 developing countries showed that between 1970 and 1990, average growth 
of resource-poor countries surpassed that of resource- rich countries. As noted above, critics 
have come to refer to this as the resource curse, a thesis that became prominent in the 1990s 
(Sachs and Warner, 1997; Gylfason, 2001; Stevens, 2003). Sceptics however, have doubted the 
methodologies and indicators used in demonstrating its existence (Bebbington et al. 2008:5). 
These cynics note that it seems premature to explain variation and lack of growth of resource-
rich countries in terms of resources alone. They argue that any explanation should be linked to 
other factors obtaining alongside resource abundance in the country, like education and barriers 
to trade (Gylfason, 2001:563-565). Furthermore, Gylfason notes that „exporting raw materials 
affects other economic variables such as total export, inflation and income distribution and it is 
these effects which indirectly reduce economic growth‟ (Gylfason, 2001:567). Gylfason further 
argues that any explanation must be periodised in history rather than generalised (Gylfason, 
2001:567). Stevens also makes a similar point arguing that economic growth is a factor of long 
term growth and is affected by many other variants within the economy (2003:8).  
Certain factors may help growth in resource rich countries. Setting up a mining project attracts 
huge amounts of foreign direct investment which comes in foreign exchange and may help some 
countries improve their credit rating which ultimately allows them to borrow money and attract 
investments in other sectors (ICCM, 2012:6). However, in a neoliberal context, companies 
operating in developing countries spend most of the money on foreign goods and services. 
Hence, a significant proportion of investable money and foreign exchange does not enter these 
economies (ICMM, 2012:6). 
As can be deduced from the above, there seems to be a wide recognition that resource 
dependence is bad for long term growth. However critics acknowledge that resource availability 
can act as a catalyst for growth which, if well managed and provided other factors are present, 
can be sustained over time (Stevens, 2003:7). Just as the economies of developed countries 
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performed well at the peak of industrialisation, the economic prowess and success of the 
developing world the 1960s was driven by mineral resources. Unfortunately for the developing 
countries, this growth could not be sustained over time owing to mismanagement of resources. In 
this regard Sachs and Warner (1997) found that Botswana and Malaysia had good management 
policies and were the only ones that grew economically and subsequently did best among those 
surveyed.  
As I noted earlier, resource dependent countries become susceptible to market dictates, such as 
price volatility, which can make it difficult for countries to plan for the future on the basis of 
resource earnings. In single commodity dependent countries, export of the main commodity 
affects the value of the currency making it rise and fall proportionate to the levels of export. This 
situation is known as „Dutch disease‟. Dutch disease was a term applied to the Netherlands in the 
1960s after revenues from natural gas exports flooded the market and increased the currency 
(Collier, 2008; Moyo, 2009). The success of mining improves the balance of payments and the 
currency strengthens. The strength of the currency makes it difficult for other sectors to export 
their goods. The effects are that other sectors outside the resource sector are suffocated. Stevens 
shows that the Dutch disease has taken on new meaning to refer to „all the negative macro-
economic effects associated with the “resource curse”‟ (2003:11). He highlights a narrower 
meaning of the term such as that used by Sarraf and Jiwanji (2001), who view it as „a failure of 
resource abundant countries to promote a competitive manufacturing sector‟ (cited in Stevens, 
2003). 
The characteristics of a resource curse presupposes that something is wrong with the structure 
and management of social, political and economic spheres of developing countries, and it is this 
that has made them fail to register sustained growth.  Until recently, not much was said about the 
role that developed countries and their institutions played in perpetuating the curse. However, 
some writers have begun to criticise foreign capital and point to the fact that in the extractive 
sector in most developing countries, information on how much wealth is earned from resource 
exports, and by whom, is not easily accessible due to what Bracking (forthcoming) calls „secrecy 
jurisdictions‟ propelled by big multinationals. The myriad network of companies that is a feature 
of new investment mechanisms and lack of clarity over ownership means that companies can 
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change their identity at any time, thereby avoiding paying taxes. This analysis was echoed in the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) discussion, Does mining benefit Africa? which featured 
key stake-holders in mining at the first Mining and Investment Forum in Lusaka, Zambia. There, 
the former British minister and cabinet member in charge of international development and now 
chair of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), Clare Short, argued for 
transparency through public documentation of mining revenue. She said: 
All over the world there has been total secrecy about the contracts, about how 
much production there was, about how much they really pay to the government, 
how much the government receives. If there is nothing to hide, let‟s get all of this 
out in the open. Let the people know what it costs, how much is being produced, 
what proportion of profits are being paid in taxes (July 2011). 
The result of this secrecy, or lack of disclosure of earnings, is that governments are denied a 
source of revenue that would allow them to reinvest part of these revenues back into the 
economy through government spending and so improve livelihoods. Although the ICMM case 
study acknowledge that mining‟s contribution to government taxes is fuzzy and varies from 
country to country, they argued that some developing countries with mining activities, such as 
Tanzania and Romania showed an increase of eight per cent in mining‟s contribution to total 
government revenue once mining activities were fully operational (2012:6).  
2.2.3. Infrastructure and social investments 
It must be acknowledged that at some points in history mines have made considerable 
infrastructure and social investments in communities. However, as critics have argued the 
enclave character of mining in the developing world restricts investments to those that support 
mineral extraction (Breckenridge, 2008; Matti, 2010). 
In Africa, the early mining period investments that companies made in communities, varied 
between regions, and times, and depended upon the politics and the agreements between the 
different groups in that society. Just as was the case with other engagements between companies 
and communities of host colonies or countries, infrastructure and social investments were often 
based on the extent to which a company was able to „commoditise and secure property rights‟ 
(Breckenridge, 2008:7). In some countries companies embarked on a social transformation 
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project. This resulted in the creation of „company towns‟ where people would be equipped with 
all the trappings of modernity, and companies could be assured of a steady and reliable labour 
force. After the nationalisation that followed independence the situation dramatically changed. 
Countries could now dictate how much they wanted to invest in infrastructure and increased 
infrastructure spending. Following the privatisation of the 1990s in many parts of the developing 
world the practice of enclaving has worsened. Mining companies have responded to growing 
calls from communities for improved investment by emphasising that their core business is 
mining. In their support, some critics have argued that „the business of business is business‟ 
(Freidman, 1962 cited in Hamman, 2003:241). However, as the resource body becomes scarce, 
and as communities with resources become more organised in resisting corporate domination 
without proper rewards, companies are being forced to increase the level of investments they 
make in communities.  
Despite all this, questions about who has the responsibility to make infrastructure and social 
investments are still being asked. Arezki et al argue that „the limited state capacity of many 
resource-based countries makes appropriate and effective investment difficult to achieve‟ 
(2012:29). They argue that not only is the government unable to „identify, implement, and 
monitor key investment projects‟ they are also likely to be corrupt hence „misspend and mis-
allocate the resource windfall‟ (2012:29). Breckenridge (2008) highlights how in 1972 the 
Gabonese government spent US $4 billion on a railway line linking the capital, Libreville, on the 
coast and Franceville, in the east of the country. However, he argues, that the expensive railway 
line has had no „measurable development benefit for the non-mining regions it passes through‟ 
(Breckenridge, 2008:14). 
2.2.4. Environment 
Woodhouse claims that „environmental issues affect virtually all aspects of development policy‟ 
(2002:136). Mineral resources have been central to the development of many parts of the world 
and have been since Roman times, although this intensified with the industrial revolution and 
more so after neoliberalism (Thornton, 1996). However, Jenkins and Yakovleva (2006:272) note 
that „the discovery, extraction and processing of mineral resources is regarded as one of the most 
environmentally and socially disruptive activities undertaken by business‟ (2006:272). 
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As I noted above, the process of mining involves a range of activities, from exploration and 
mining to consumption. Each of these activities can at times be destructive to the environment. A 
report by Earthworks and Oxfam (2004) found that there had been a rise of open pit mining 
around the world because owners and financiers discovered that it is cheaper „to blast away the 
soil and surface rock, called, “overburden”, rather than dig underground shafts‟ (2004:4). As the 
surface area required for open pit mining is much bigger than that required to sink shafts, this 
creates permanent damage to expansive landscape and vegetation (Dambwizi, 2009). The report 
goes on to claim that „open pit mines produce 8 to 10 times as much waste rubble as 
underground mines‟ (Earthworks and Oxfam, 2004:4). The amount of solid waste left after 
treatment, depends on the mineral being mined. However, in most countries several years of 
large scale mining means that the amount of „waste created per unit of recovered metal‟ has 
increased as high grade ores are depleted and mining turns to lower grade ore (Earthworks and 
Oxfam 2004:4). As the disposal of waste can be expensive, most mines are known to dump 
waste, either by creating „tailing dams‟ which are in communities or by pouring it into rivers. 
Pouring waste in rivers not only pollutes marine life but can set off a dangerous food chain 
which if it gets to humans can be fatal. The Oxfam report gives examples of the Omai Gold mine 
in Guyana and two mines in Peru whose communities have suffered terrible consequences 
because of waste material from mines (2004:5-6).   
In the treatment process of certain heavy metals such as gold and copper, certain chemicals, such 
as cyanide, are used. According to the report, a rice grain of cyanide, if not disposed of properly, 
can be fatal to those nearby (Earthworks and Oxfam, 2004). Furthermore, mining is responsible 
for 13 per cent of sulphur dioxide emissions‟ (Breckenridge, 2008:9). Sulphur dioxide causes 
acid rain which is destructive to crops. Most importantly, it is harmful to the physical health of 
people if inhaled.  
2.2.5. Extractive behaviour of mines 
Once extracted, minerals cannot be replaced and unfettered extraction that has intensified in the 
wake of neoliberalism inevitably leads to problems, especially as mineral resources slowly 
deplete. Therefore, from the point of view of mineral resource dependent economies, the point 
that needs to be addressed is how abundant mineral resources can be used to build more 
sustainable economies. Hammersley argues that minerals development and sustainability are 
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incompatible because of the very fact mining is „a form of development that takes away rather 
than adds to‟ (1993: xiii). However, he also recognises that mineral extraction can be reconciled 
with sustainable development as long as it is done in a socially, economically and politically 
acceptable way. He makes the point that is made by proponents of mining-driven development 
that mineral extraction itself can strengthen the ability to develop in a sustainable manner (1993: 
xiii). Closely related with this view, Jenkins and Yakovleva (2006) also note that continued 
extraction and sustainability can exist side by side. They state: „depletion of mineral resources 
should be compensated by generation of new wealth, which, in the form of useful lasting capital, 
can benefit present and future generations‟ (2006:271). They are of the view that mineral 
depletion may not be an issue in „the foreseeable future due to the possibility of recycling many 
non-fuel metals and minerals‟ (2006:271). They contend that advancement in technology and the 
discovery of other new mineral deposits will ensure the survival of future generations 
(2006:271). However, the report by Earthworks and Oxfam (2004) dispels the basis of these 
assertions. Using gold as an example which could help put things into perspective with other 
minerals, the report argues that, of all the gold in storage or use about two-thirds of it came 
directly from the earth and only a third came from recycled material (2004). 
A large part, (over 60 per cent on average) of most developing countries income comes from 
mineral exports (ICMM, 2012). Therefore, sometimes the immediate needs of supporting 
livelihoods may be more important than conserving them. Echoing this view, Arsel and Angel 
(2012) and Huckle (1996) both argue that policies that limit exploitation and protect reserves are 
often outweighed by current needs and market demand. Therefore, as long as there is demand, 
local policies will inadvertently be designed to guarantee that demand. Arsel and Angel (2012) 
show how in Ecuador, even where ownership of mineral resources is in the hands of the 
government with proclamations of being in the interests of local people, there is still continued 
extraction with no reduction in the negative effects on the environment.  
2.3. Conclusion 
In developing contexts mining has had contradictory outcomes on broader development. On the 
one hand it has driven economic growth which at times has been related to broader benefits such 
as wages, social investments, expenditure on infrastructure and economic diversification. On the 
other, however, profits are spirited away from the host country before they can be taxed, 
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employment can be exploitative, there is little social expenditure or investment in infrastructure 
and little is done to offset environmental devastation. Thus the relationship between mining and 
sustainable development depends greatly on a variety of factors such as the regulation or 
deregulation of ownership, capital flight, the labour market, and trade. In the next chapter 


















3. Evolution of mining in Zambia. 
3.1. Introduction 
There are three very important periods in the political economy of Zambia that put into context 
the influence of copper mining on development discourse. The first is the colonial period during 
which copper mining began, in the late 1920s. The second is the golden age of capitalism which 
coincided with the country‟s independence in 1964. The third is the economic crisis that started 
with the oil crisis of 1973, leading to a recession later that decade, and spiralling debts. For the 
most part this debt crisis was the root of the structural adjustment programmes of the late 1980s 
and 1990s. 
3.2.  Colonial period 
The British interest in what was then Northern Rhodesia stemmed from the extraordinarily rich 
copper resources that were discovered in what is now called the Zambian Copperbelt. Interest 
was further fuelled by the increasing global copper prices (Fraser, 2010). This spurred social, 
economic and cultural transformations, most importantly the annexation of Northern Rhodesia as 
a British protectorate and colony in 1924 (Fraser, 2010). The impact of this on people continued 
to independence and depended on race and status. Despite this, Ferguson (1999) contends that 
the language of development was apparent in the reasons why so many Zambians migrated to 
„urban‟ areas to seek employment in the mines. Like MNCs themselves, academics, mostly 
foreigners – like the anthropologists and sociologists of the Manchester School, drawn to 
Northern Rhodesia by changes brought by mining activities - explained this movement as a 
desire to „adapt‟. To them this was a „liberal affirmation that the African was becoming an 
urbanite‟ and this „was an affirmation of modernity‟ (Cooper, 1983 quoted by Ferguson, 1999:5). 
But most importantly, social scientists saw this affirmation of modernity as a desire to be like the 
West, and, as this was being driven by the mining industry, it echoed the West‟s own rise to 
become the symbol of modernity (Ferguson, 1999:5). This kind of reasoning has continued to the 
present day. Greig et al (2007) have argued that such social transformations as occurred at the 
time would be understood as development and modernity. Referring to Marxist perspectives, 
they proclaim that Karl Marx was „in awe of the revolutionary transformations that modern 
capitalism brought in its wake, transforming cultures, dissolving superstition and drawing pre-
capitalist cultures into the orbit of modernity‟ (2007:55).  
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In terms of how work was conducted, Fraser (2010) refers to Epstein, who documents how the 
initial stages of copper mining may have been distressing for local people. He highlights the 
strenuous conditions that local workers worked under, such as carrying heavy machinery in 
difficult terrain that their white superiors, unfamiliar with the surroundings, thought untameable 
(Fraser, 2010:4). Despite these hardships, in 1926, the industry was a source of 30,000 jobs for 
Africans and about 4,000 skilled jobs for whites (Larmer, 2010:32). However, this „progress‟ 
was halted following the depression of 1929 which saw massive job losses, especially for 
Africans. As soon as the depression was over, estimates suggest that the mines were responsible 
for nearly 60 per cent of all men in formal employment working as waged labourers in Northern 
Rhodesia (Larmer, 2010). 
Despite the apparent benefits, such as the jobs provided for local people, critics argue that 
trickery surrounded initial concessions, firstly between local chiefs and the BSAC, and as the 
importance of local chiefs waned, between the BSAC and the two major mining companies, 
Roan Selection Trust and Anglo American Corporation (Simutanyi, 2008). These agreements 
and the resultant mineral rights created a system which was designed to satisfy external markets 
and interests rather than fulfilling local needs and helping to create conditions necessary to 
promote and prolong local capital accumulation (Simutanyi, 2008; Bush, 2010). Larmer notes 
that, at this early stage of mining, the main purpose of the mines was to provide for the interest 
of white settlers at their headquarters in Salisbury in Southern Rhodesia, in what is now called 
Zimbabwe (2010:34). Furthermore, as profits were siphoned out of the territory, they were 
deposited „into the coffers of the international companies that owned the mines‟ (Larmer, 
2010:34). The only time financial rewards were given was when colonial masters distributed 
money across their colonies allegedly for developmental purposes, but even then, the main local 
beneficiaries of this gesture were white settlers (Larmer, 2010:4). Indigenous Africans were only 
rewarded as a way to placate them as they became increasingly rebellious (Larmer, 2010). This 
could have been buoyed by the growing possibility of independence.  
Larmer (2010) further argues that throughout the colonial period mine owners and the colonial 
administrators did not take interest in the wider development of Northern Rhodesia. This view is 
contradicted by Breckenridge who notes that following Sir Ernest Oppenheimer‟s promise in the 
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1920s that Anglo, the biggest investor in the Copperbelt mines at the time, would „take a leading 
part in the progress of Rhodesians‟, massive investments in infrastructure were made between 
1940 and 1960 (2008:12). On the Copperbelt, Anglo purchased „L5, 000,000 of rolling stock 
rented to the state railways‟ and provided a „L20, 000,000 loan, and a further L10, 000,000 
power surcharge levied on the mines for the financing of the Kariba hydro-electric dam‟ 
(Gregory, 1962 quoted by Breckenridge, 2008:12). Furthermore between 1948 and 1964, 
government, in collaboration with mining companies, funded the construction of 100,000 houses 
which influenced the creation of company towns on the Copperbelt (Breckenridge, 2008). 
Throughout the 1940s and beyond, copper mining continued to be the most important source of 
the colonial state‟s „development‟ efforts (Breckenridge, 2008:12). 
Despite the positive gesture, the claim by Anglo to contribute to the „progress‟ or „development‟ 
of the region could be viewed with scepticism given, as Larmer (2010) suggests, they did not 
consistently provide money directly to the state until immediately before independence. These 
acts of good will which included other welfare benefits such as food subsidies were given only 
for the benefit of mine employees and were not provided to all Zambians. The desire by the 
mining authorities was to build a „modern‟ African family that would provide a stable permanent 
pool of workers (Breckenridge, 2008:12).  
3.3. Independence  
Although acquiring independence in 1964 presented an opportunity to reorganise economic 
structures, political concerns attracted more attention and may have surpassed economic 
concerns as matters of national interest (Breckenridge, 2008). Larmer echoes this by saying that 
the primary demand of the leaders of Northern Rhodesia was „indigenous control of political 
institutions rather than the wholesale redistribution of wealth‟ (2010:34). However, in order to be 
successful politically and continue implementing development programmes, leaders needed to 
continue obtaining revenues from mining. Thus copper became even more central to the 
development plan of the newly independent Zambia. Green (2009) notes at independence in 
1964, Zambia‟s status as a middle income country with prospects to develop into an even more 
prosperous nation was because of its rich copper deposits.  
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Tables 2 and 3 below highlight how output in the mining industry can be linked to overall 
economic growth.  
Table 2: Sector contribution to GDP, 1990 to 2005 in per cent of total GDP 
Sectors  1990 1998 2000 2005 
Industry(mining) 11 7  7 
Agriculture 50 70 72 72 
Services 23  23 21 
Source: World Bank 
 














Source: Simutanyi (2008) 
Economic growth in Zambia is inextricably linked to the copper industry. Hence, decline and 
increase in copper production alternate with decline and increase in overall economic 
performance and this is demonstrated by Zambia‟s economic history. For example, between 
1969 and 1976, the heyday of independent Zambia‟s copper production, production averaged 
700 000 tons per annum. These high levels also spurred economic growth. The tables above 
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reinforce this. They show that between the periods 1970 to mid-2000 a decline in copper 
production was almost always followed by a decline in overall economic performance. During 
this period overall GDP growth averaged 1.4 per cent, and this was blamed on among other 
things low levels of investment in the copper mines (Langmead and Barker, 2006:27). Related to 
this, exogenous forces such as copper price, also affect production and ultimately its contribution 
to growth. It must be noted that determining prices is outside the control of internal mechanisms, 
although it affects how much employment is created and foreign exchange earned. Stephens 
reports that the price decline after 1973, which coincided with increased government control 
precipitated wider economic decline (2012:7). As tables 2 and 3 above show, around the same 
time, copper production dropped from 750, 000 tons in 1973 to 550, 000 tons in 1980. 
Unfortunately, as Adam and Simpasa argue, the relatively small size and contribution of 
Zambian mining companies to world copper output means they cannot influence market forces 
and hence are always „price takers in the global market, a market that is very difficult for small 
producers‟ (2010:59). 
In order to realise the goals that had been set at independence, the Zambian government at the 
time embraced nationalistic principles prominent on the continent in the 1960s. The ideals 
involved partial nationalisation of all companies beginning in 1969, followed by full 
nationalisation and the creation of the philosophy and programme of Zambianisation in 1972. 
Economically, the idea behind this approach was that all sectors of the economy had to reflect 
indigenous ownership and involvement at senior levels, and, by so doing, increase the benefits 
accruing to the Zambian economy and people (Breckenridge, 2008). Socially, unlike the 
situation regarding Anglo‟s contribution to infrastructure in the 1930s which was mainly for the 
benefit of miners, post-independence welfare provision was not just for miners but went beyond 
to include non-miners. Using the mines as a cash cow, the government attempted to create a 
cradle to the grave type corporate social responsibility welfare system (Simutanyi, 2008). The 
situation was more pronounced in mine communities where free medical services, recreational 
facilities and education were provided and sometimes food was distributed. The mines even 
provided nappies to parents of newly-born babies and coffins when a mine worker or a mine 
worker‟s relative died (Simutanyi, 2008:9). 
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Most commentators on mining in Zambia, including Ferguson (1999; 2006) and Fraser (2010) 
recognise that the economic success and the wealth amassed in the early part of nationalisation, 
which was mostly because of the successful mining industry, was significant in how people on 
the Copperbelt perceived themselves as members of the global modern world. However, Adam 
and Simpasa, highlight that this period marked the beginning of an economically disastrous three 
decades of state involvement in the mines (2010:64). The intermeshing of, on the one hand, state 
involvement and a government eager to please its public, guaranteeing employment and 
remaining extremely dependent on mines as the only source of capital, and on the other, 
unfavourable market conditions for copper, proved detrimental to the country‟s economy. From 
the successes of having „one of the highest GDPs in Africa, three times that of Kenya, twice that 
of Egypt, and higher than Brazil, Malaysia, Turkey and South Korea‟ in 1969 (at the peak of 
nationalisation) by the late 1970s, the economy had deteriorated, a situation  made worse by the 
oil crisis and the recession in the mid-70s (Fraser, 2010:6).  
Despite the difficulties in the economy caused by low growth prospects amid falling copper 
prices, still exuberant with the enthusiasm of independence, the government continued its 
elaborate efforts implementing welfare and development programs. Simutanyi, for example, 
shows that between 1969 and 1975 the government made unprecedented investments in the 
construction of new schools, hospitals, and roads (2008:2). And even though, as Nyambe and 
Kawamya (2005) show, copper production rose around the same time, as the state tried to 
maintain the minerals‟ contribution to national revenue, the dramatic fall in prices on the 
international market were too severe to buffer the country from shocks and sustain the high 
levels of investment that were being made in infrastructure. Thus the state had to find new 
sources of money. The country‟s foreign reserves were fast depleting and insufficient to keep up 
with such high levels of investment. As reserves dried up, government borrowed heavily and the 
country experienced periods of high inflation and a plummeting currency (Van Donge, 2009:74).  
3.4. Zambia in the 1980s: Structural adjustment programmes 
In June 1980 the then president of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, said, „We were born, unfortunately, 
with a copper spoon in our mouths‟ (Zambia Daily Mail, 22
nd
 June1983 and cited in Simutanyi, 
2008). Kaunda‟s remark echoes the English expression „to be born with a silver spoon in your 
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mouth‟. This saying is used when describing someone who is „spoilt‟ because they come from a 
privileged background where everything is given to them on a plate, and has never had to come 
to terms with the harsh realities of ordinary life or had to really work for their living. Kaunda 
was speaking on the back of a difficult period in the 1970s. These difficulties would culminate in 
the near collapse of the Zambian economy in the 1980s, and eventually, Kaunda‟s downfall. It 
was a situation that had reversed the bright hopes that were the talk of the day in the exuberance 
of independence. As stated earlier, at independence in 1964, Zambia was judged to be a middle-
income country with all the hallmarks of a prosperous nation (Green, 2009). Yet by 1980 the 
country‟s economy was not just worsening, it was becoming one of the poorest in the world. 
The government responded to this by increasing their participation in the running of economic 
affairs. Though not a complete welfare state, Zambia operated a basic needs approach to 
development, subsidising food, agriculture products and other requirements and administered a 
strict price control regime (Kalinda and Floro, 1992). But, as the economy continued to decline, 
state involvement presented more challenges than solutions. Kalinda and Floro (1992) argue it 
hampered entrepreneurial dynamism and limited the ability and capacity of people to create 
capital locally. They further note that, during this period access to „capital and intermediate 
consumer goods‟ became scarce and outside the reach of many people (1992:7). The result was 
overwhelming dependence on imports. To fend off the effects of this predicament the 
government adopted „import substitution and high protection of domestic industry‟ (Kalinda and 
Floro, 1992:7). The main objective of this measure was „to facilitate industrialisation by 
providing the environment for the so called “infant industries” to grow‟ (Kalinda and Floro 
1992:7). However, this „brought little change in the low productivity level at which most 
enterprises were operating‟ (Kalinda and Floro, 1992:7). Short term successes such as increased 
number of jobs for locals were recorded. In the long term, it stifled growth, and lack of 
competitiveness in these industries resulted in the production of substandard goods. The success 
of import substitution was dependent on the continued rise of copper prices which would bring 
new capital (Kalinda and Floro, 1992). 
Inability to generate capital and lack of new investment in the mines accelerated the demise of 
the mining industry and the broader economy in the 1980s. The government continued to borrow 
heavily from donor countries and IFIs. Having tried several locally driven reforms with cuts in 
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certain subsidies, without yielding the desired results, the government tried to access much 
needed capital (the only possibility being more loans). As a precondition, and as elsewhere in the 
developing world, the government was required by potential funders, notably the IMF and World 
Bank, to embark upon profound restructuring of the political and economic landscape. These 
reforms were known as SAPs. The idea behind them was that fundamental adjustments of the 
Zambian economy would bring them in line with global conditions and accelerate growth and 
development. Hence, the late 1980s economic and political spheres were dominated by debates 
about whether or not to adopt SAPs.  
The most important idea underpinning the SAPs was the neoliberal orthodoxy couched within 
the language of globalisation. To most Zambians this was supposed to be the start of a new era of 
„development‟. To advocates of SAPs such as the IFIs this was „the only game in town‟ (Bush, 
2010:240). They claimed that if developing countries like Zambia were serious about ending 
poverty and developing their economies they had to do whatever they could to be „properly 
integrated into the world economy‟ (Bush, 2010:240). Furthermore, they were of the view that 
poor countries‟ governments should not interfere in the economy as this would destroy the 
conditions necessary for rapid economic growth, while if they privatised they would be able to 
bring in a flood of new private capital investments (Ferguson, 2006:11). The IFIs argued that the 
economic climate of the time was not conducive for growth as the Zambian government, like 
most African governments, was too large, inefficient and corrupt. To these agencies, creating 
suitable conditions for growth meant deregulating the domestic economy and integrating trade 
and resources with the corporate dominated world economy (Bush, 2010:240). 
However, Cammack has questioned how well SAPs „forced‟ on the developing world were 
thought out, since the main proponents, the IFIs, although principally intending „to reduce 
poverty and other inequalities‟, are also „faithful to the disciplines required for capitalist 
accumulation on a global scale‟ (2002:157). He argues that the interests of capitalist 
development are at odds with egalitarian grassroots development. Capital interests include: 
authority of capital over labour, the unimpeded operation of capitalist markets for 
labour….the receptiveness of governments to the needs of capital, the presence of 
domestic and global regulatory orders capable of reinforcing the disciplines 
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essential to capitalist production and the dissemination of ideologies justifying 
capitalism and dismissing alternatives (2002:159).  
Thus sceptics such as Cammack (2002) and Nyamnjoh (2000) have come to see neoliberal 
policies as simply a way of ensuring easy access to the resources of the „Third World‟. Sharing 
similar sentiments, Ferguson argues that this „new paradigm‟ was principally about „getting 
African governments to accept, implement, and legitimate policies made in Europe and North 
America largely in the interests of Western banks‟ (Ferguson, 2007:83). Closely related to these 
views, Rowden notes this „rapid, across-the-board, premature trade liberalisation....has in fact led 
to the destruction of many existing industries, particularly those that were at their early stages of 
development entailing massive job losses without necessarily leading to the emergence of new 
ones‟ (2011:508). He quotes estimates of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) that suggests that „total income losses for Sub Saharan Africa from 
trade liberalisations amounted to US $270 billion over the past two decades‟ (2011:08). The 
most high profile dissenter has been Joseph Stiglitz, a former World Bank employee who has 
now become an ardent critic of his erstwhile employers (see Globalisation and its Discontents 
2002). Although appearing to offer a balanced view, for the most part he criticises the IFIs and 
developed countries calling them „the faceless symbols of the world economic order‟ that „are 
under attack everywhere‟ (2002:3). Referring to former French president Jacques Chirac, Stiglitz 
notes that even conservative politicians have understood that „globalisation is not making life 
better for those most in need of its promised benefits‟ (2002:3). He goes on to state „It is clear to 
almost everyone that something has gone horribly wrong‟ (2002:3). These views show that, 
although some influential entities of society are adamant that easy flow of capital can be a 
remedy for many of the problems that developing countries experience, they are silent about its 
contradictions, the poverty and inequality that is created (Cammack, 2002:160). 
There was controversy surrounding adoption of SAPs in the latter part of the 1980s and early 
1990s, with political parties, civil society and international bodies vying with one another. This 
suggests that some sectors of society strongly believed that Zambia‟s economic decline of the 
period was due to declining copper prices and lack of investments in mines rather than what 
others perceived as extreme neo-liberalism. The continued underperformance of the mining 
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sector and the economy throughout the 1980s resulted in hardships for many, leading to civil 
strife and political tensions. Most of these were driven by unionised workers. This marked the 
beginning of the end to the one party rule that had been in place almost since independence. On 
the economic front, in 1989 the government reengaged fully with the IMF and World Bank, 
having rebelled against reforms and broken-off relations earlier in the decade. The change of 
stance by the government from its earlier position was marked by accepting the appointment of 
an IMF approved expatriate governor of the Central Bank of Zambia (Adam and Simpasa, 
2010:64). 
3.5. 1990 to present  
Two decades of economic decline attributed to an underperforming mining sector made the 
transition to multiparty politics and a change of government in 1991 inevitable. The 1990s would 
be a period in which reforms that had been tried in the 1980s without much success would come 
to be implemented, helped by the ever growing role of the IMF and World Bank. A new party, 
the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), came into power largely on the promise of 
economic improvement for the majority and the adoption of SAPs (Larmer, 2010). Although 
highly contested, the Zambian government adopted these measures. As a reaction to adopting 
SAPs some successes such as the short-term stabilisation of inflation were achieved (Larmer, 
2010). 
The most controversial of all the SAPs was the privatisation of parastatal companies especially 
the mining conglomerate ZCCM. The need for privatisation of the mining industry was premised 
on the basis that it would promote overall „growth with equity, development with justice, and 
sustainability with employment‟ (Bush, 2010:238). However, for the IMF and the World Bank 
privatisation was non-negotiable. They demanded privatisation, as a former finance minister 
Edith Nawakwi remonstrated: 
We were told by our advisers who included the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank that not in my life time would the price of copper change…. 
[Conversely, if we  privatised] we would be able to access debt relief, and this 
was a huge carrot in front - like waving medicine in front of a dying woman. [We 
had no option but to go ahead] (Dymond et al. 2007:6).   
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Dissenting voices within the country saw it as an imposition of outside influence on Zambia by 
IFIs for the benefit of capital. From early on, with many anxious to see the immediate benefits of 
privatisation, even before the whole process was complete, sceptics argued that private capital 
had failed to bring in more investment in all sectors of the economy, and that investor interest 
was limited to mining. They further argued that this neoliberal logic or market fundamentalism 
only exposed Zambia to more exploitation especially with regard to development agreements 
which enhanced the process in which resources were obtained for a pittance (Fraser, 2006).  
If the nationalisation period gave Zambians a sense of ownership of their resources and made 
them feel powerful, the process of privatisation reshaped power relations between the state, its 
people and mining companies and redefined companies‟ economic, environmental and social 
responsibilities. Most notable in the shifting power base was the way the government gave 
„unnecessary concessions to the mining companies‟ (Green, 2009:5). These concessions, known 
as „development agreements‟, were not signed on a level playing field but were designed to 
cajole and persuade mining companies to invest in Zambia, at whatever cost and with little 
regard to local people. The point of these agreements was to exempt new owners from liabilities 
incurred by the former mining conglomerate ZCCM, such as pensions for employees, taxes and 
laws on pollution (Fraser and Lungu, 2006). Many people argued that the agreements were 
characterised by unfavourable concessions and the periods involved were considerable, most of 
them ranging between 15 and 20 years. The most controversial parts of the agreement were that 
companies would enjoy below par royalty taxes of around 3 per cent, compared to the widely 
used 5-10 per cent, while in some countries rates were going as high as 30 per cent. Other 
agreements included the notion of price participation. The idea behind it was that the government 
would forego their claim on „the difference between benchmark price and current price‟ of 
copper (Dymond et al. 2007:7). A limit was placed on how much price participation the 
government was entitled to during the lifespan of a mine (Dymond et al. 2008:7). Worse than all 
this, there were no agreements in terms of the use of mining revenues and sharing of profits or 
employment creation. As a consequence, money that could otherwise have been used to generate 
wealth locally, for example by lending to businesses, was siphoned off to the countries of 
investors. This would again lead to shortage of capital as had happened in the 1980s. Most mines 
were also accused of contracting workers from investors countries‟ of origins. 
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As the finance minister Nawakwi stated above, other factors that made privatisation of mines 
inevitable according to the IFIs were the unfavourable market conditions particularly the low 
copper prices which resulted in the country experiencing the lowest growth rates in the region, 
and comparable to the late 1920s depression (Erdman and Simutanyi, 2003:63). Prices during the 
1990s were around the lowest they had ever been. However, since privatisation periods of low 
prices have resulted in employers reducing the number of employees in companies. It has also 
led to investors pulling out of the mines leaving it to government to sort out the consequences of 
their actions. This has been devastating in a country where 90 per cent of all foreign earnings and 
jobs have historically come from the copper industry. Growth rates in the 1990s were on average 
less than 1 per cent, the lowest among the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
countries which had been growing at around 2.8 per cent, except for South Africa (Erdman and 
Simutanyi, 2003: 63). As an effect of low growth, unemployment and inflation soared, with „per 
capita incomes 50 per cent less in 1999 than they had been 25 years earlier‟ (Green, 2009:1). In 
this bleak economic outlook the World Bank (2003) reported that Zambia‟s position on Human 
Development Index (HDI) had dropped from 130 in 1975 to 163 in 2001. 
Before privatisation, government could use tax from mining companies with little opposition. 
After privatisation with the government‟s grip on power loosened, it became more difficult to 
easily access cash from copper sales. To increase the amount of money government was getting 
from mining companies and to counter the problems of previous governments‟ mismanagement 
and lack of accountability, a proper tax regime, a modern system of taxes and royalties targeted 
at mining companies was introduced in 2008. This would add nine per cent to government 
revenue (Green, 2009:2). However, as the Financial Times reported, even this new tax system 
was „no harsher than standard rates worldwide‟ (Green, 2009: 2). Dymond et al further note that 
revenue transferred to the Zambian government has possibly been the lowest compared to other 
mineral rich countries. They give the example of Botswana that gets up to as much as 70 per cent 
from its mining companies in taxes (2007:6). 
Some observers have credited privatisation with bringing new technology and creating some jobs 
by prolonging the lifespan of mines and reprocessing old copper waste dumps. Others are 
sceptical about the quality of employment that has been created. The number of jobs created is 
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also highly disputed. Sceptics of privatisation are of the view that, despite some supposed 
benefits, privatisation has made inequality thrive. New companies are accused of pollution and a 
callous disregard for environmental matters and causing the displacement of local people. In the 
decades following the advent of mining and through the independence period, Simutanyi (2008) 
argues that there is no evidence to suggest that environmental concerns formed much of the 
debate on mining and development in Zambia. If they did, then they might have been overlooked 
in favour of attracting foreign investments (Simutanyi, 2008). The Open Society Initiative for 
Southern Africa recently documented how in the Copperbelt town of Mufulira „the mine‟s huge 
chimneys belch fumes into the sky, water sources are polluted by runoff from the mines as well 
as by raw sewage and waste from the community‟ (Lee, 2012). Although mining companies are 
reportedly making huge profits due to the demand for Zambia‟s copper, they do not clean up 
their mess.  
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted how the mining industry has evolved in Zambia from colonial times 
through a series of stages to the recent neoliberal era. Each of these stages has had varying 
developmental impacts and challenges. The rich copper resources of Northern Rhodesia attracted 
British colonial interest, though beyond extracting copper and other minerals, little was done to 
support wider development. At independence in 1964, for example, fewer than one thousand 
Zambians had completed secondary schooling (Mwanakatwe, 1968).  The great expectations of 
the early independence period were soon to be dashed, only to be replaced by a mood of 
abjection in a time of severe economic decline (Ferguson, 1999) and followed by the promotion 
of SAPs by IFIs, which have constantly occupied an ambiguous position (Cammack, 2002).  The 
adoption of SAPs entailed the privatisation of mining under extremely unfavourable market 
conditions. Among the consequences of this was the decrease of government control over mining 
companies that resorted more to 'core business', to the neglect of a sense of social responsibility 
with dire social and environmental consequences. At the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA) Summit held in Lusaka in June 2011, United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton 
is reported to have said: „it is easy, and we saw this during colonial times, it is easy to come in, 
take out natural resources, pay off leaders and leave. And when you leave, you don‟t leave much 
for the people there. We don‟t want to see a new colonialism in Africa‟ (see Taye, Ethiopian 
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Times 2011). As Clinton noted, a view which could be supported by many in Zambia, the role 
that foreign forces have played is highly contestable. Although some may see it as development, 
to others it evokes bad memories of colonialism and the continuation of primitive accumulation, 























This dissertation has tried to demonstrate that mining can have a contradictory set of impacts on 
development: livelihoods and employment, social expenditure, infrastructure investments, 
versus, extraction, environmental destruction, and suppressing economic diversification. In the 
case of Zambia, we have seen how the evolving structure of the industry, from British 
Protectorate to nationalised independence, to structural adjustment, relates to changing 
development impacts. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate how contemporary Zambians, 
particularly those currently entering the job market, position mining within the broader story of 
development. In order to do this I spoke to 14 people. These comprised seven young men and a 
young lady at university, three older men, who had previously worked in the mines and two 
female and one male lecture at a local university.  
This research applied a qualitative methodology taking the form of semi structured interviews. 
These interviews were conducted in Kalulushi on the Zambian Copperbelt. In addition, 
documentaries, newspaper and academic articles contributed to data collected for this exercise. 
Being born and raised on the Copperbelt, I have ardently followed the activities in the copper 
mining industry in Zambia and rarely a day goes by without a story in the media either calling 
for the government to introduce some form of taxes or to scrap them. Copper mining has also 
formed the stuff of songs and politics.  
Discussions on qualitative research normally centre around its reliability or validity as a method 
of inquiry or conducting research, in comparison to other paradigms such as quantitative 
research. Unlike quantitative research, which others see as more reliable in as as much as it is 
quantifiable, qualitative research is less so. However, Guba and Lincoln have challenged these 
assumptions identifying several weaknesses with quantitaive research. These range from „context 
stripping‟, „exclusion of meaning and purpose‟, „disjunction of grand theories with local 
contexts: the etic/emic dilenma‟, „inapplicability of general data to individual cases‟, „exclusion 
of the discovery dimension in inquiry‟ to eliminating the vital interaction between inquirer and 
inquired (Guba and Lincoln, 1994:105-107). However, in an effort to give qualitative research 
credibility, Creswell and Miller (2010) denote that critics sometimes implement certain 
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procedures. These range from „member checking, triangulation, thick description, peer reviews, 

























Table 4 List of participants 
 Participant Approximate 
age 
Gender Occupation 
1. Constantine 23-25 Male Student 
2. Muyunda 23-25 Male Student 
3. Chooma 23-25 Male Student 
4. Lundu 23-25 Male Student 
5. Chipo 23-25 Male Student 
6 Paul 23-25 Male Student 
7. Gloria 23-25 Female Student 
8. Patrick 23-25 Male Student 
9. Emmanuel 27-30 Male Mine employee 
10. Manda 60-70 Male Former Director 
11. Chanda 50-60 Male Lecturer 
12. Robert 50-60 Male Former mine workers (MUZ) 
Chairman 
13. Mwama 55-65 Female Lecturer 









4.2. Data size and limitations 
This data set is not a good sample or a proper representation of the demography of the people in 
Kalulushi. It is not balanced in terms of gender or age. The reason for this is because at the 
proposal stage of my dissertation, I was interested in having two dimensions to data collection. 
These were to be based across age and class. My thinking was that such a distinction could 
highlight different perceptions. For example, whereas educated senior employees are able to 
change jobs easily when the mines can no longer sustain their livelihoods, this is more difficult 
for less educated employees and younger people. After consultation and in trying to narrow the 
focus of the dissertation, I was advised that I should perhaps concentrate on young people as new 
entrants into the job market, a market with very few jobs. At a time of great challenges for most 
developing countries and as revolutions, started by a youth in Tunisia, swept across parts of the 
Arab world, a dissertation that captured some perceptions of youth felt like a good area of 
research.  
Fokwang quoting Furlong and Durham (2000) notes that „more often than not, ethnographies of 
Africa have treated “youth” as a supporting category rather than a subject of exclusive inquiry‟ 
(2006:69). He goes on to say that although the youth have not been given much voice by 
academia, the social contexts and structures they find themselves in demand otherwise (2006). 
As this dissertation has a specific focus on perceptions of youth, and although I interviewed 
mostly university students, I also interviewed university lecturers, and other people who had 
worked in the mines who I thought could provide important information.  
Having conducted 14 interviews, I felt that the themes that were emerging were extremely 
uniform. I interpreted this to be that people had the same anxieties or with regards to university 
students that they were a homogenous group. They all went to the same university, were from 
similar backgrounds and were around the same age. Hence, it was perhaps not surprising that 
they had very similar views. But could it also have been a point of theoretical saturation? While 
there „are no definitive rules for determining saturation‟ it can be identified as „the point at which 
no new insights are obtained, no new themes are identified and no new issues arise regarding a 
category of data‟ (Straus and Cobin, 1990 quoted by Bowen, 2008:140).  
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4.3. Ethical  and methodological considerations 
In as much as I was interested in talking to young men and women, it was more difficult to 
arrange interviews with young women. When I tried to meet with them, most of them asked me 
what the interview was about and once I told them, they claimed they did not know enough about 
mining to have an interview. It was easier for me to get access to male university students than to 
those going to work. I felt they were more comfortable being interviewed when they were all 
around rather than individually. In fact, as I invited them for tea one afternoon to set up interview 
dates and explain the purpose of my interviews, I found them more outspoken and at ease and, in 
hindsight, perhaps even more so than during the actual interviews. I arranged interviews for the 
following week but I was forced to postpone our meetings until they were available. In the end, 
most of them agreed to be interviewed on the same day over one weekend. I negotiated for two 
consecutive days, the 17
th
 and the 18
th
 of December 2011. 
Even if this was not a particularly sensitive topic, I have used pseudonyms in table 4 above, to 
protect the true identity of my respondents. I also clearly explained my purpose at the beginning 
of each interview and told respondents that they were not obliged to answer any questions they did 
not feel comfortable with. Furthermore, I made it clear to them to feel free to respond in any 
language they felt comfortable in. I felt I had to be careful in the way I represented this issue so 
as not to make my respondents feel like I doubted their ability to speak English – a high status 
language in Zambia, and where the ability to speak it can sometimes denote the difference 
between educated and uneducated people. Clearly, this could be a sensitive subject. I appreciated 
this and did not want my respondents to feel I was profiling them. However, I did not anticipate 
how difficult it would be to translate technical phrases like „sustainable development‟ into 
vernacular. The difficulty of translating certain words that respondents may have faced became 
apparent to me when I specifically asked respondents - in the interviews - to explain sustainable 
development in their own language. In a lot of the interviews I did not get an explanation and 
when I asked the question again, many responses were „I don‟t know‟. I also noticed that none of 
the answers were completely in vernacular or English from start to finish. Instead respondents 
would engage in what sociolinguists term „code switching‟, switching from one language to 
another on explaining a point. However, most of the interviews were in English.  
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Mcnamara (2009) cited by Turner 2010 makes a number of recommendations to conducting 
successful interviews one of which is interviewer neutrality. I must acknowledge that at some 
points during interviews I struggled to divorce my personal feelings and knowledge of the place 
from what some respondents were saying. However, I tried not to let this affect my data 
collection by following my interview guide and set questions. Also I may have been helped by 
the fact that the views of most of my respondents closely resembled mine. Sometimes I felt I 
expected a certain answer and was a bit disappointed when I got a different answer. For example, 
I asked one miner whether he understood what was meant by „copper is a wasting asset‟. Having 
gone to the same school as him, where this formed a big part of our social studies and 
environmental classes, I was disappointed when he said he had not heard of it.   
4.4. Interview process  
The interviews I conducted took the form of a general interview guide, standardised open and 
sometimes informal conversations. Informal conversations were not part of the planned 
methodology but only emerged due to circumstance.   
To what extent was it necessary to distinguish between having an intellectual or academic 
conversation which in the academic arena is known as a general interview guide approach, and 
what is called an informal conversational interview, what I think of as a merely social 
conversation?  For me, what was crucial was where I was likely to get good data. As some critics 
have argued, „Predesigned and structured instruments blind the researcher to the site. If the most 
important phenomena…. at work in the field are not in the instruments, they will be overlooked 
or misrepresented‟ (Henry, 1998:35). 
The interviews took the form of asking questions I had prepared. However, I was unfamiliar with 
conducting interviews. Even though I had tried to practice before-hand, I realised that 
interviewing people I hardly knew would be quite different from the small amount of practice I 
had had. I was thus a little apprehensive, particularly with my planned interviews with university 
lecturers. Here I knew I would be faced with people who were not only older than me but who, I 
thought, would have a tendency to be domineering, given the fact that they are lecturers and are 
used to being „in charge‟. As it later turned out, my anxieties were sometimes baseless.  
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Taking note of the way I have used interviews raises consideration of their importance, a 
reflection of how I conducted them, how I might have been perceived by my various 
interlocutors. Robson (1993:228) calls the interview a „conversation with a purpose‟ and Kvale 
(1996:5) calls it a „professional conversation‟. Not all interviews are asymmetrical in terms of 
power and control. They are often the result of a negotiation and ideally create a space in which 
interviewer and respondents are equal partners in the construction of meaning. The interview is a 
very specific kind of cultural performance. My experience in conducting interviews revealed 
how respondents differed considerably in their experience of interviews and their expectations of 
how our encounter might proceed. University students were different from their lecturers, for 
example, in the way they seemed to perceive me and my purpose. The former ZCCM director 
and the former MUZ chairman appeared to be much more articulate, more knowledgeable and 
much more at ease than the young miner.  
As became apparent when I started the interviews, the mention of the word „interview‟ meant 
people felt they had to assume a different tone to suit the occasion. Sometimes, at the mention of 
interviews respondents assumed a certain amount of seriousness, no matter how much I asked 
them to relax. Others, however, became extremely relaxed and would fidget and even answer a 
phone call mid-interview, which made it difficult when recording. During one of the interviews 
with a student, at the end, having turned off the recorder, I asked him if he had any advice for me 
and then he said, „Oh, yah here let me just speak the truth and tell it as it is‟. He then proceeded 
to give me a more candid response. My view was that despite the importance I attached to the 
information I was collecting, by taking on a simple and relaxed tone I would benefit more and 
gain richer information.  
I found most interesting things were revealed in an informal conversation without all the 
formalities of a general interview guide approach or a standardised open ended interview. I think 
that is because once people felt they were not being recorded they felt at ease and free to speak 
their minds as may be perceived from the comment of the university student above. It is possible 
that recorders make respondents feel they have to give their best and most intelligent answers. In 
fact, one very important conversation I had was with a former mine worker who was a very 
senior employee of the mines. I had gone to ask him for a paper he had written and to arrange for 
an interview. However, without me even asking him any questions he went on and started giving 
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me very interesting and important information. This was a bit difficult for me because I was not 
prepared for the interview but was nonetheless interested in what he was saying. As I knew him 
to be a friend of my parents, an accomplished individual and a much respected man it was 
difficult for me to ask him to reschedule the interview. I just listened carefully asked a few 
questions and afterwards excused myself by saying that I had to write down a few of the things 
he had said. 
Of the 14 interviews conducted, the three with lecturers were not recorded electronically as they 
refused to be recorded. Other unrecorded interviews were those with a former senior employee 
of the mines with whom I was unprepared to have an interview on the date we spoke. 
Nonetheless, our conversation provided useful information.  The other was with the former MUZ 
official which I thought was being recorded but it later turned out the recorder was off. For these 
interviews I relied on the notes that I had taken during the course of the interviews. I decided to 
take notes because I felt it was important to do this just in case something happened to the 
recorded interviews. Being in Zambia with intermittent electricity supply because of „load 
shedding‟, and knowing that I would have to return to Durban, I was anxious about the safety of 
my material. In the event that I lost my recorded interviews I would at least have a back-up in the 
form of written notes and so I would not risk losing everything. The downside to this was that it 
was a tedious process. I may have sometimes missed an opportunity to probe important points in 
greater depth.  Sometimes, I did actually miss important points and was embarrassed to ask the 
interviewee to repeat themselves.  
4.5. Data interpretation 
The nine other interviews were recorded and transcribed. I then embarked on a process of 
thematic analysis. Some of the main themes I had identified in my analysis include: politics, 
ownership, livelihoods and employment, economic growth and foreign exchange, capital flight, 
multiplier effects, social and infrastructure investments and environment. Braun and Clarke 
define thematic analysis as the „method of identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) 
within the data‟ (2006:79). They go on to state that „it minimally organises and describes your 
data set in (rich) detail‟ but often goes beyond „and interprets various aspects of the research 
topic‟ (citing Boyatzis, 1998). However, Braun and Clarke (2006) also argue that an interviewer 
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is not always passive to what he presents as themes. They cite Ely et al (1997) who argue that „if 
themes „reside‟ anywhere, they reside in our heads from our thinking about our data and creating 
links as we understand them‟. I did not have specific themes I was looking for. They emerged 
from the responses I got from my respondents. I did this process by highlighting and grouping 



















5. Key Themes: Dimensions through which mines impact on development 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter has the following objectives: first, it seeks to understand, from the point of view of 
young people on the verge of entering the job market, and other key informants on the 
Copperbelt, their perceptions of the past, present and future roles of large scale copper mining in 
development; second, it explores what respondents take to be the relationships that exist between 
mining and communities; and third, it asks to what extent copper mining has impacted on local 
people‟s quality of livelihoods.  
I identified the following main themes in my respondents‟ narratives: mining‟s impact on, 
livelihoods and employment; economic growth and foreign exchange; capital flight; the 
environment, and multiplier effects. Overshadowing these themes was the view that politics and 
policies around owenership, such as choosing whether to nationalise or not, strongly affected 
how each of these key themes played out. In examining these issues, this chapter highlights the 
views of people on the Zambian Copperbelt, demonstrating how local discourse gives evidence 
of nostalgia, as respondents discuss the transformation that has occurred over time, specifically 
between periods of nationalisation and privatisation. It also considers whether such changes in 
ownership have led to copper mining supporting or undermining more general development. The 
general view of most of my respondents was that in the past, under nationalisation, mines did 
more for local communities and the economy. At present, most respondents are of the view that 
minings‟s impact on development and the economy has been reduced, but that under the right 
policy framework, mining still has the potential to contribute much more to the economic growth 
and development of the country than it has done since privatisation.  
5.2. Politics 
Most of my respondents were of the view that the problems in Zambia and the apparent lack of 
development were directly a result of politicians failing to deliver. They shared the view that 
change in the broader political structure and a strong will from politicians were needed in order 
to achieve meaningful development. Muyunda, a fourth year university student in development 
studies, stated „We need serious policy change and policy implementation, and change of 
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management and government, and political will‟ (Interview with Muyunda, 18
th
 December, 
2011). Chipo, also a student, shared this sentiment. He commented: „Political will is needed to 
counter the problems of copper dependence‟. According to Chipo, „even for diversification to be 
successful, it needs political will and without it, we as a country will be susceptible to turbulence 
and uncertainty such as was the case during the 2008 financial crisis‟ (Interview with Chipo, 18
th
 
December, 2011).  
The statements by Chipo and Muyunda imply that politics and the entire political structure 
within the country, and the Zambian government is the problem. This view was echoed by other 
respondents.  Robert put it thus: „Our central government has problems prioritising needs of 
communities. We need a decentralised power base‟ (Interview with Robert, 20
th
 December, 
2011). The issues raised by Robert, which are also echoed by Chipo and Muyunda, about 
Zambia‟s economic choices and development trajectory are linked in complex ways. These are 
not just local or national matters but have entered an arena in which international politics are 
fought out between governments and powerful bodies such as the World Bank and the IMF. 
Under the rubric of globalisation and neoliberalism, IFIs designate countries that embrace and 
adopt their policies without strong opposition as those practising „good governance‟. This can 
often be the difference between attracting investment or accessing loans. As such countries like 
Zambia have been held captive to such rhetoric. Some consequences are that policy decisions are 
not just subject to the needs of a sovereign state. Branded as a conduit of good governance, SAPs 
had serious implications for the mining sector. As I will show later, some sections of society are 
of the view that SAPs are to blame for the underperforming mining sector and the Zambian 
economy.  
5.3. Ownership - nationalisation or privatisation? 
Most respondents were of the view that government ownership of the mines would be the best 
way to increase the mining sector‟s contribution to development. This was as a result of what 
they saw as private companies‟ lack of interest in local communities and in the general 
development of the country. This could be surmised by the commonly held view that foreign 
mining companies were in Zambia only to make money and did not care about the concerns of 
the general public. Most respondents attributed this to the privatisation of the 1990s which was 
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aimed at improving the productivity of the mines among other things. Robert, a retired miner and 
formerly chairman of the Mine Workers Union of Zambia argued: 
Most people don‟t see mines as theirs. During ZCCM days people depended on 
mines. Now they no longer depend on mines, at least not the majority. Except for 
seeing big lorries damaging our roads and pollution, the impact of mining is little 
felt. The working conditions in the mines now are worse than they had been 
during ZCCM, and the new companies, they just don‟t care. They pay less and 
less to the majority of workers except the few senior employees. And there are 
also fewer ventures by mines in the communities, in fact I could say may be none. 
Those days the mines were there for people. I remember asking my boss, a Mr. 
Blakkie, for help to repair a blocked sewer which had flooded the township. I 
said, „Sir, people can‟t be living like this. We are going to have an outbreak of 
diseases and people are going to die‟. He said, „Robert, what can we do about it? 
Can you do something?‟   I said, „Yes‟. He said, „Ok! What do you need?‟  We 
went back to the plant and he directed they provide me with the few things I 
needed to do the repair works. We got a few pipes that were lying around the 
plant and they asked me to organise a gang of boys to help me. Just after that as 
Parents Teachers Association Chairman I said, the school where my children go 
needs cement to repair damaged floors. I got the bags of cement for that project 
and again we went and helped them. At the time I was working as foreman and 
was a union chairman. From then on they moved me from where I was working 
and we established a maintenance department that was repairing things around the 
place, painting houses and all that, whether or not they belonged to ZCCM. But 
you go and look around the townships and see what‟s happening now for yourself 
(Interview with Robert, 20
th
 December, 2011)  
Roberts‟s view was shared by Chipo, the university student. Chipo (echoing Marx) argued that 
„under the present circumstance it is not possible to be sustainable. We don‟t own the means of 
production. The new owners only want to maximise profits‟ (Interview with Chipo, 18
th
 
December, 2011). The suggestion Robert and Chipo are making here, which was also shared by 
many other respondents, is that the relationship between communities and mining companies has 
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shifted for the worse since privatisation. At the core of Robert‟s argument, bringing to the fore a 
debate that has reigned for many years in Zambia, are debates over which system of production 
would be most beneficial to the Zambian people: the IMF and World Bank advocated free 
market ideals, or state participation in economic activities. Robert recounts how mining 
companies in the nationalisation era paid attention to community welfare unlike the new owners. 
Unfortunately for Zambia, privatisation under SAPs was presented as non-negotiable, necessary 
and mandatory, given the wider economic difficulties and the acute lack of capital that the 
country was experiencing. 
Most respondents were of the view that privatisation was conducted in a rather disastrous way. It 
worsened the relationship and widened the gap between companies and communities. Post 
privatisation relationships are guided and influenced by the mines‟ insistence that their main 
objective is to concentrate on their „core business‟. This has restricted their activities to mining at 
the expense of what had formerly been considered as their social responsibilities – such as 
housing, education, healthcare and the provision of infrastructure. As Robert indicated above, 
private companies are not just denying people a fair share of their wealth but are helping to 
degrade the already existing infrastructure. Most views were overshadowed by the constant 
comparison between the performance of the mining industry during periods in which they were 
under government control and periods in which they were privatised.  
It is not just questions of ownership that have impacted on copper‟s contribution to development. 
The pro-cyclical price of copper is also a plausible explanation for the haphazard contributions of 
copper to wider development and the welfare of local communities. As Manda, a former director 
of ZCCM noted, „companies at the moment have been making lots of money as copper prices 
have sky-rocketed since we sold the mines. This would be a good time to have windfall taxes 
which we could then put into a fund that would then make finances available and accessible to 
people‟ (Interview with Manda, 20
th
 December, 2011). At the time of privatisation in the late 
1990s, the price of copper on the London Stock Exchange had reached a historical low-water 
mark but by 2002, prices had started to rise, reaching unprecedented levels by the mid-2000s. 
Given that copper still remains Zambia‟s main export commodity and a major source of foreign 
exchange, unpredictable rises and falls of prices makes long term planning difficult. However, 
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most of my respondents noted that the positive economic outlook of the last few years was a 
direct result of high copper prices. The concern, however, is that this could be temporary, since 
even at its best the country struggles to register any significant and permanent economic gains. 
Having said this, however, from the inception of mining, periods of high copper price have not 
always translated into more benefits for the nation, particularly ordinary Zambians (Larmer, 
2010). As Fraser (2010) also acknowledges, despite the recent rise in the price of copper, 
Zambians still suffer from low wages, insecure employment, poor local amenities and unpleasant 
living environments. 
5.4. Livelihoods and employment 
Many critics such as Ferguson (1999; 2007), Dymond et al (2007), Nyambe and Kawamya 
(2005), Bebbington et al (2008), Hogenboom (2012) and Breckenridge (2008) have noted the 
correlation that exists between mining and people‟s livelihoods. Overwhelmingly, the theme of 
livelihood and employment permeated all the interviews I conducted. All my respondents were 
of the view that resources should not just be extracted but be used to create employment and 
improve livelihoods for whoever was in need. Throughout the history of mining in Zambia, 
people have depended on mines not just as a source of employment, but – especially during 
nationalisation - to obtain social amenities and welfare benefits. However, this is contested. 
Mususa (2010) notes resentment of this situation by some people as they perceived this to be the 
control of family life by mine companies. Other views are more critical, and argue, that the 
eventual collapse of the mining industry was due to the government‟s elaborate welfare system 
which redirected resources away from the development of mining activities, resources that could 
otherwise have been reinvested in new explorations and upgrading the mechanisation of existing 
mines. 
Most people on the Copperbelt have at some point in their lives either worked in the mines or 
have had relatives who have worked in the mines. However, whereas the parastatal ZCCM was 
able to create jobs to suit the government‟s broader social agenda, this is no longer possible 
under privatisation. As I will show when discussing multiplier effects of mining, the number of 
jobs created under privatisation are limited, as investors sub-contract most important services to 
companies from outside Zambia, highlighting the enclave character of mining activities in the 
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country. Manda narrated how privately-owned mines were now outsourcing goods and 
manpower. He argued „they would rather bring in an Indian guy or a Chinese guy to do the job 
that a Zambian can do. All this while lots of local workers go without jobs, and, mind you, these 




In an interview with Mwama, a lecturer, I asked what role she thought copper had played in the 
history of the development of the Copperbelt. This is what she said: 
Let me begin by saying we should ask where does the name Copperbelt itself 
come from? It is called the Copperbelt because of copper, umukuba. I was born 
and brought up here, in Chingola, so I have seen things change. My father was a 
miner. But your question is, what is the role? The role! Well, the role has changed 
at different times. When I was growing up mines had a very good reputation. 
Mines were seen as higher status. Everybody wanted to work in there. It didn‟t 
matter whether somebody was educated or not. Young people wanted to work 
there. It was associated with good living. My father was able to meet family 
needs, unlike the situation today with most miners. At the time companies didn‟t 
just siphon things out. They ploughed back into the communities. There were 
entertainment facilities which I don‟t see now. Clinics and hospitals were of high 
standards. We had free regular checkups. Over the years I‟ve seen a shift. The 
role of mining now is not the same. My father got enough wages to sustain our 
family.  Now it‟s not the same. Clinics are not in existence. Nchanga hospital and 
many others are not the same. Now locals are given as little as possible. Poor 
conditions are rampant. If basic needs cannot be met then the mines are not being 




According to Mwama, before privatisation, mining used to play an important role in the lives of 
employees both directly through wages and indirectly through providing the means of social 
reproduction through education, healthcare and recreation. She argues however that its impact 
has been reduced due to lower wages and lower social spending. She attributes this to new 
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companies. Mwama also notes the significance of mining to Zambians as a source of 
employment. However, she argues that whereas before privatisation most people may have 
wanted to work in the mines rather than in other sectors, now people go into mining as a matter 
of last resort. As Fraser (2010) shows, despite its controversies at the inception of mining most 
people sought work in the mining industry. This continued in the newly independent Zambia as it 
became the most sought after and most lucrative profession, to both educated and those not so 
educated. These days it trails behind a number of apparently more attractive options like 
teaching. However, given that Zambia still struggles to diversify its economy and create 
sufficient jobs to meet demand, it would be interesting to find out the reasons for the declining 
desire by people to work in the mines. This issues was not fully addressed as I thought it to be 
beyond the focus of this dissertation. It would go beyond simply considering the supposed better 
rewards that may be offered by other industries to analysing a whole realm of issues, as for 
example, safety in the mines.  
Muyunda a university student noted: 
The biggest problem we have is that the benefits of mining are not being 
transferred into the community. Yes, mines may provide some employment, 
which is good from an economic point of view, but, we are also talking about 
acting in a way that is socially responsible. For example, yes, you can paint a 
hospital but how can that benefit the entire population? These same mines, like 
we heard in the case of KCM [Konkola Copper Mines, a subsidiary of Vedanta 
listed on the London Stock Exchange] they are dumping all these chemical wastes 
in the Kafue River. So now we have other problems like the Kafue weed. That‟s 
like choking the life out of Kafue; fish are dying. We have rotting fish in the river, 
fungus and they are not cleaning it up. They are supposed to ensure that residents 
receive clean water because they do have the engineers who can do that. They 
have the resources to purify that water and they are not doing it.  What we are 
seeing is more pollution instead (Interview with Muyunda, 18
th
 December, 2011). 
Muyunda makes an important distinction between the contribution of mining to the economy and 
the local community. He argues that while mining companies may in the quest to extract 
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minerals create jobs, which is good for the economy, they  also harm environments by polluting 
rivers on which people‟s livelihoods in that community depend. However, the jobs created are 
not just for people within that community and may benfit others from outside. Hence, critics 
such as Arezki et al (2012) argue that in order to ensure that mineral resources benefit many 
local people, governments in developing countries should perhaps distribute mineral revenues 
directly to people. 
5.5. Economic growth and foreign exchange  
Mining has historically been Zambia‟s biggest source of foreign earnings and growth. As 
Muyunda stated, „it brings in more money into the economy‟ (Interview with Muyunda, 18
th
 
December, 2011). However, critics note that although it has accounted for the majority of foreign 
exchange, its contribution to overall economic growth, has been disproportionate. Since the 
inception of mining, Zambia‟s foreign earnings from copper sales have averaged 90 per cent 
while its contribution to growth has been around 9 per cent, and less than 1 per cent has been 
paid in taxes. And, as Manda noted, „If copper‟s contribution to GDP is not double digit then it is 
unsustainable‟ (Interview with Manda, 20
th
 December, 2011). Manda‟s views are supported by 
the fact that in Zambia there is a close-knit relationship between copper earnings, exchange rate 
and overall economic performance. Throughout Zambia‟s history, low copper earnings have 
alternated with a depreciation of the local currency, the kwacha (Green, 2009). Similarly, high 
copper earnings have created conditions conducive for the Dutch disease to flourish, that is, an 
artificial appreciation of the kwacha which has sometimes been harmful to non-traditional 
exports, as they become too expensive. However, Adam and Simpasa (2010) argue that, although 
this has been true in the past, from 2002 growth in copper exports which has gone alongside 
appreciation of the currency has occurred side by side with an upsurge in non-traditional exports. 
They argue that the reduction in non-traditional exports seen in the past may have been more to 
do with structural policy issues and weakness on the supply side rather than a copper boom 
(2010:84). 
In order to sustain the spillover effects of mining, Manda argues that „it is better for mines to 
employ more local people who can pay taxes as opposed to bringing in foreigners‟ (Interview 
with Manda, 20
th
 December, 2011). His statement echoes Lunda, a university student, who 
53 
 
noted, „we have seen a lot of externalisation of profits. If companies pay local workers more, 
those workers can send their children to school and give their families money to start businesses 
and that is proper sustainability‟ (Interview with Lunda, 18
th
 December, 2011). 
Most of my respondents lamented the low taxes and royalties that mining companies were 
paying. Much of this, however, was to do with the concessions and agreements that the Zambian 
government made with investors at privatisation. Apart from depriving the government of 
revenue through inadequate taxes, mining companies were accused of engaging in illegal 
activities. Manda explained – the arguably illegal - way in which new investors sold unprocessed 
copper in the form of copper blisters, limiting economic benefits to the country. He argued, 
„Those copper blisters contain gold, and other minerals. Now, forget copper, how much is gold 
and how much money is the country losing out from the sale of those things which they have no 
control over?‟ (Interview with Manda, 20
th
 December, 2011).   As taxes play an important role in 
helping governments undertake development projects such as provision of healthcare, education 
and poverty reduction, loss of taxes severely impacts on Zambia‟s ability to have a sustainable 
economy.  
Another respondent Emmanuel, a miner and an employee of one of the copper mines in 
Kalulushi, expressed concern about the new investors‟ mining practices and their effects on the 
economic growth of Zambia. 
If we are to be strict, with these investors things are different from the way they 
were in ZCCM. ZCCM was even interested in development. Underground, we 
have surveyors or geologists. They might, for example, find a body of copper ore 
surrounded by waste rock. They will start digging waste rock and separate it from 
the copper and then they start mining. But these investors, they are just interested 
in the copper and leave the waste rock. Like that, we can‟t go far. All they are 
interested in is making money and like this we can‟t go far. So, even the life-span 
of copper in Zambia is very short. But we all hope that these new mines that they 
are opening might prolong mining in Zambia. However, eventually copper will 
finish. Hence, the future is in agriculture. When we compare our economy with 
others, even with say Malawi, Malawi has no copper or any other minerals as 
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much as we do here, but their economy is far much better and they are better 
organised (Interview with Emmanuel, 24
th
 December, 2011). 
Emmanuel laments the lack of interest in development by the new investors. Like other 
respondents, he is of the view that foreign investors are only interested in copper and overlook 
local people and development. According to him this is particularly problematic given the finite 
nature of copper. He further argued that Zambia still had a chance to rectify the situation and 
achieve growth through its new mines. He suggested that as copper will eventually be depleted, a 
good sustainable approach would be to invest in agriculture. Emmanuel attributes Zambia‟s 
economic problem to its dependence on copper. This resonates with some critics who interpret 
the problems associated with mineral dependence and lack of development in resource-rich but 
poor countries in terms of the resource curse thesis.   
5.6. Capital flight 
Most of my respondents were of the view that investors pay no regard to their well-being. They 
pointed to the limited links of mining to the local economy, the reduced number of jobs available 
to Zambians, and the lack of social or infrastructure investments while, at the same time, reports 
abound of investors repatriating their profits to their countries of origin. This came out when I 
asked whether under the current climate, people had a sense of connection to the copper mines. 
Most of the respondents like Robert and Mwama above were of the view that they did not have a 
sense of connection, partly because of what they saw as the inequitable distribution of the 
benefits of copper alongside repatriation of profits. One respondent, Paul, a university student, 
asked:    
How can you say it‟s ours when we don‟t even know where the money goes? 
Most of the money goes to other countries, where the same owners of the mines 
come from. We don‟t produce anything here in Zambia, not even nails so the 
mines spend all the money outside Zambia allegedly buying goods and even 




Sharing a similar view, Patrick, a university student, noted: 
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The problem that we have is that our focus is still on the mines. We are not being 
successful at diversification and worse still the distribution of copper benefits is 
inequitable as money is going to other countries. Under the current policy foreign 




Gewald and Soeters (2010) have highlighted the susceptibility of the Zambian economy due to 
how it has interacted with investors and financial markets. They argue that foreign investors, 
while taking advantage of „Zambia‟s liberalised investment climate to gain ownership of the 
country‟s greatest economic asset …. have consciously engaged in “shape-shifting” in response 
to changes in the market for copper‟ (2010:156). They have done this by constantly changing 
their names, addresses and corporate identities, especially after the expiration of the tax rebate 
period, thus making it difficult to know who really is in charge and who should be answerable 
for their activities. This is even more controversial given the limited benefits filtering through to 
the public. Before privatisation, however, capital concerns were not because money was leaving 
the country but rather that not enough of it was being created locally.   
5.7. Multiplier effects  
One of the major ways in which the themes being discussed in this section were discussed and 
were linked, from livelihoods and employment to economic growth and foreign exchange was, 
as Chooma, a university student explained, that the „development of copper could only be 
sustainable if we use copper to develop other industries‟ (Interview with Chooma, 17
th
 December 
2011). For Chanda, a lecturer and a former employee of the mines, Zambia‟s strategic 
geographic position and natural endowments such as water would make diversification easier. 
He said: 
We should use our comparative advantage. We have a lot of water compared to 
other countries in the region. We can develop hydro electric power stations to 
generate electricity, which we could supply to neighbouring countries and 
because of being landlocked we are strategically positioned to act as a centre of 
business in the region (Interview with Chanda, 22
nd
 December, 2011).  
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The biggest challenge with Zambia has been that the economy has hugely depended on the 
performance of the mining sector and how well it links with other sectors like tourism and 
manufacturing. During the nationalisation era, development of this linkage was on top of the 
government‟s agenda and was pursued through „direct state ownership of part of the supply 
chain, preferential sourcing, import substitution industrialisation and value chain cooperation 
between ZCCM, its suppliers and public research institutions‟ (Fessehaie, 2012:3). The result of 
these measures was a well-developed local supply cluster of diversified activities including a 
thriving manufacturing sector. This was composed of large state-owned entities and smaller 
private enterprises (Fessehaie, 2012:3). Most of these however, struggled to survive on their own 
even with strong government support. This was due to an amalgamation of factors, most 
importantly, falling copper prices which led to reduced cash-flow and loss of foreign exchange, 
but also poor management within ZCCM. This negatively affected the capacity of ZCCM to pay 
suppliers, and supply firms to import inputs in good time (Fessehaie, 2012:3). The persistence of 
problems in ZCCM reduced the company‟s ability to monitor the quality of goods and services 
supplied to them, many of which were gradually becoming sub-standard (Fessehaie, 2012:3). 
Despite this, ZCCM was mandated to buy from these companies. As a consequence most of 
these companies not only fell behind international quality standards but failed to expand and 
died. 
After privatisation, development agreements insulated new mine owners from continuing to 
support local industries as the nationalised ZCCM had done. Mining companies would no longer 
be mandated to take a lead in supporting the growth of other local industries. This resulted in an 
influx of foreign companies affecting the whole value chain of mining. Some of these companies 
became popularly known as „brief case companies‟, suggesting that they lack fixed abode in 
Zambia, a situation that is strongly resented by the locals. More than this, as Robert stated: „The 
companies that have come up after privatisation are all connected to the new owners. For 
instance, there is now a whole lot of people rushing to get car loans, loans that are facilitated 
through companies with connection to the mines‟ (Interview with Robert, 20
th
 December, 2011). 
Also, their insistence on concentrating on core business has meant that the country‟s National 
Development Plan (NDP) that had been proposed by the government at privatisation is no longer 
supported by the mines. Following the large number of redundancies that followed privatisation, 
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some former employees of the mines acted on the government‟s pledge in the NDP and 
registered small firms aimed at supplying goods and services to the mines. However, as 
Fessehaie (2012) demonstrates, the success of this initiative has varied with the majority of these 
small companies being either static or in decline. But instead of being a positive step, giving a 
chance to local suppliers and supporting employment creation for Zambians, most respondents 
criticised new investors with bias in awarding contracts and giving job opportunities. According 
to my respondents, companies with contacts among senior mining authorities benefit more than 
others. They also accused senior managers of mines of nepotism. 
Accusations of senior managers being asked to register companies and subcontracting their 
services despite being employed by the same companies were highlighted by my respondents. 
Some respondents also mentioned the growing inequality after privatisation. Although quite 
difficult to prove, Lunda a university student argued, „Right now I can tell you most senior 
managers at Mopani earn as much as 100 times what the average miner earns‟ (Interview with 
Lunda, 18
th
 December, 2011). 
5.8. Social and infrastructure investments 
The „company model‟ approach which was started by Anglo American Corporation before 
independence and the creation of the „cradle to grave‟ welfare policies afterwards resulted in 
massive infrastructure and social development programmes (Simutanyi, 2008; Breckenridge, 
2008). However, before independence the motivation behind such projects was not simply 
because companies at the time wanted to improve local people‟s living conditions, but were 
strategic to enable them to conduct their businesses. Ferguson (1999) also notes the desire by 
companies to create a certain kind of African family. There was huge social spending through 
independence and the nationalised period but significantly declined after privatisation. As Manda 
observed:  
You see, just as Ramcoz [Roan Antelope Mining Corporation] and Anglo 
invested in Kariba to supply electricity to the mines, the same way these 
companies today can do the same. They could also be investing in the railway; in 
fact, we already started doing that for them. See! These companies always 
complain that the cost of doing business in Zambia is high. But why is that cost 
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high? The unit of production, compared to other copper producing countries like 
Chile, who can transport their copper cheaply due to a sea coast, is high! So the 
copper here, will be expensive. Investment in the railway line would bring down 
the unit of production costs. Currently most of the copper is transported by roads. 
This is very expensive and it also destroys roads. And now our government 
pushes that cost of repairing roads on us local people, the tax payers. Now if we 
consider that there are over 4.5 million unemployed people then, one would 
assume that those employed people are overburdened with taxes. So what I‟m 
saying to you is a lower cost of production would make our copper as competitive 
as that produced in other countries. So companies will come here and the spillover 




Here Manda reinforces the notion that the relationship between companies, governments and 
people evolved and transformed into a new unequal realm after privatisation. If MNCs 
desperately needed Zambia‟s copper in the 1920s, that may have prompted infrastructure and 
social spending as Anglo did; today they may not see such pledges as necessary. At present the 
power balance has tilted strongly on their side. As Manda noted above, the contribution of 
mining companies in setting up infrastructure today can certainly not be equated with the period 
before privatisation. This is not to say that there is no contribution to infrastructure, but for him 
and many others it is insufficient. This is, however, contrary to certain elaborate self-flattering 
media reports that are sponsored by MNCs that always highlight their contributions to 
communities (see Zambian Traveler, 2011). According to most of the people I interviewed, 
companies should do more to put up infrastructure so that when copper is depleted, good 
infrastructure left behind can help attract investment in other sectors like tourism, in order to 
sustain people into the future. In what is perhaps the most important document ever to be 
released that demonstrates how much mining companies re-invest back in the communities they 
work in, Stephens (2012) shows the 28 companies surveyed for the 2008 EITI report only 
contributing US $32, 000  between them to community and social initiatives. Additionally, the 




Simutanyi notes that before privatisation in Zambia „sound environmental policies were not 
enforced‟ (2008:8). However, most of my respondents are of the view that the deleterious effects 
of mining on the environment were exacerbated after privatisation and are concerned about the 
new extractive practices, the ever growing open pit mining and treatment processes such as 
leeching. These practices have been known to damage land and pollute environments at levels 
that were previously not seen. Most respondents argued that these practices were unsustainable. 
Chipo, a fourth year university student, commented: 
Ah, I don‟t know if you‟ve, ah, I‟m yet to like kind of prove this.  I‟ve heard there 
are certain mining companies that are using leeching as a way of trying to extract 
copper. It‟s kind of like you pour acid and then you extract everything that is 
there. So whether there is no copper or what. It‟s quite destructive and you cannot 
say that is sustainable because once they have even left potholes here in Zambia 
after they have done mining the land becomes very useless and you can‟t use it 
for farming (Interview with Chipo, 18
th
 December, 2011)   
However, the extent to which environmental degradation has worsened after privatisation is not 
very clear. Growing up in Zambia in the 1980s and early part of the 1990s, I recall numerous 
occasions, perhaps on a weekly basis, when the then government-run mines released sulphur 
dioxide into the atmosphere. Although people may have complained, I would argue that they 
seemed willing to tolerate it. This was perhaps due to the fact that they felt a stronger sense of 
connection to the mines. However, now people feel that this connection has weakened, worse 
still there are no tangible benefits to communities. Although mining companies in some places 
have started a process of reprocessing old copper waste dumps that the old state owned ZCCM 
had left in communities, most of my respondents see this only as a self-serving exercise that is 
due to the appreciation of copper prices and the desire of companies to cash in. 
On a similar point, in responding to a follow up question on the consequences of mining 
companies paying less tax, Constantine, also a university student remarked:  
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Well, some of the consequences are that the organisations are going to benefit 
more while we as a country are going to benefit less. The mining sector does have 
a negative impact on the environment, so while they are messing our environment 
and jeopardising the abilities of the future generations to provide for themselves, 
we should also be benefiting so that if anything, in future we might have enough 
money, enough infrastructure, or resource and knowledge to obviously mitigate 
any forthcoming situations that would have been caused by the mining activities. 
For instance, we have heard about pollution and the cutting down of trees where 
some mining companies have been dumping their waste in our water sources such 
as the Kafue River and the cutting down of trees to expand their mining activities. 
That might have a long term effect on agriculture itself and on the weather and 
also cause the displacement of people. So while that is happening we should see 
tangible benefits. In terms of the taxes the royalties that they are paying. Yah 
that‟s the way I see it (Interview with Constantine, 18
th
 December, 2011). 
When asked what he thought was the link between sustainable development and copper 
Constantine commented: 
There is a link. The link is that, you know, just as copper or the mining of copper 
can bring about development, that development is supposed to be sustainable. For 
instance, the case of Kalulushi, there are areas, I don‟t know if this is the East, the 
West (using hand gestures) but where there were mines and people are not 
allowed to go there because sometimes there tends to be, I don‟t know if I can call 
them sink holes. So look at the huge piece of land that is prohibited to people who 
can‟t farm there; people can‟t even go there.  They can‟t do anything in that place 
because there is a possibility of having sink holes, because the mines have been 
abandoned. So when you look at that, copper here, the mining of copper and other 
things is simply unsustainable. Because when you mine copper and you know the 
mining of copper is not always going to be there at some point the mine will have 
to move to some other location. So they should do their business in such a way 
that even when they leave, even when the holes remain underground, they don‟t 
affect the livelihood of people. That mine can always be moved from one place to 
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another. They must make sure even when they leave that whatever they leave 
doesn‟t affect other people (Interview with Constantine, 18
th
 December, 2011). 
Constantine‟s remarks capture both the concern over the inevitable depletion of copper resources 
and the havoc that is caused through displacement of local communities from productive land. 
Constantine highlights the complexes and paradoxes of the benefits and disadvantages of mining.  
Despite this, his views and those of my other respondents do not seem to be against mining. 
They are confident that mines could still bring about development. However, in order for this to 
happen, government must strive to reconsider its policy position so that people are able to take 
advantage of the benefits offered by mining today to build a more sustainable local economy, 
one that would last a lifetime. But as has been noted these efforts are being hampered by 
suggestions of exceedingly low taxes and highly advantageous concessions that mining 
companies in Zambia enjoy. These concessions have been designed in such a way that they 
preclude the country from renegotiating the contracts (Simutanyi, 2008).  Another common view 
is that government must increase its participation in the economy. Most of my respondents 
seemed to suggest that lack of national ownership meant that Zambians had given away the 
rights to its copper mines. As Manda argued: 
You have to strike a balance between privatisation and nationalisation; an extreme 
of either is dangerous. Privatisation without the proper monitoring of companies 
can lead to a whole lot of problems. Having said that, and as we saw in the past, 
nationalisation can also lead to less productivity and a whole lot of problems 
(Interview with Manda, 20
th
 December, 2011).  
5.10. Conclusion 
The findings in this chapter reveal a striking degree of consensus in respondents' views across 
generations.  Among these are perceptions that there has been a serious political failure to deliver 
development. Prominent in this failure is the perception that the privatisation of the mining 
industry was conducted in a disastrous manner, especially with regard to loss of tax revenue, 
resulting in a serious loss of national wealth and of development potential. While there is some 
evidence of contest (Mususa 2010) about perceptions of the nationalisation period, a sense of 
nostalgia remains for the provision of social amenities and welfare benefits. Respondents' 
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anxieties caused by privatisation include the lack of employment opportunities for local people, 
the differential wage structures for local and expatriate staff, and the enduring effects of 

























6. Conclusion and recommendations 
This dissertation began with Muyunda, a university student in his final year of study, narrating 
his experience and that of his family. At the centre of his narrative and in line with the main 
theme of this dissertation has been the perception of educated young people about to enter the 
job market and other key informants, as to their understanding of the relationship between large 
scale copper mining and development. This required investigating Zambia‟s relationship with 
capital, the impact of large-scale mining and the implications of mineral resource dependence in 
development. This conclusion will reveal the main issues dealt with in previous chapters, briefly 
reflect on some common perceptions among my informants and draw some parallels with the 
literature. The second part offers recommendations for further research.  
The first part of the literature review explored the broader debates on the impact of mining in 
development in the developing world. The themes considered included: livelihoods and 
employment; economic growth and foreign exchange; environment and infrastructure; and social 
investment. The chapter focused on the relationship that MNCs have with countries in which 
resources are found, its origins and how this relationship has transformed since colonialism. It 
highlighted experiences of some countries in Latin American and Africa. Part of this discussion 
centred on dissecting the theory of the resource curse. This thesis argues that something 
embedded in the political and economic structure of developing countries limits these countries 
from acquiring significant and sustainable gains from their resources, and this is the reason why 
they continue to lag behind the „development‟ trajectory. The chapter, however, argued that an 
informed analysis of the lack of development in the developing world is one that goes beyond 
mineral abundance and considers a range of factors from the beginning of mining. It outlined the 
impact of colonialism (the significance of „the past of the present‟ Cooper, 2002) and the binaries 
that this set up, the effects of property rights and markets, to the recent neoliberal policies. These 
are the building blocks to the current relationship that has existed and continues to exist, one in 
which foreign capital has come to have more power than countries with resources. The power 
that MNCs have acquired also means that they neglect their contribution to „development‟ and 
sometimes even avoid paying taxes.   
The second part of the literature review offered a historical trajectory of copper mining in 
Zambia from inception in the 1920s focusing on some of the key moments, upswings and 
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downturns. The chapter also highlighted the interrelatedness of the Zambian economy to copper 
mining. Tracing the evolution of the industry, it offered an insight into other factors that have 
affected the performance of the Zambian copper mining industry. However, understanding these 
complex dynamics goes beyond investigating the internal workings of the Zambian state and 
economy to include an analysis of the role that colonialism, colonial property rights, markets, 
IFIs and neoliberalism have played. 
In this research 14 respondents were interviewed to ascertain their views on the role of copper 
mining in the development of Zambia. Although this dissertation focussed mainly on youths, it 
revealed that the views of the older generation closely resembled those of youths. Both groups 
demonstrated remarkable awareness of events in the mining industry. However, whereas young 
people‟s views were specific to the neoliberal period of the 1990s, adults were able to give a 
much longer historical narrative. The main argument that echoed through both young people‟s 
and adult‟s views was that politics and government‟s policies, foreign ownership of the mines 
and recent neoliberal policies have disadvantaged Zambians. Most respondents argued that local 
communities‟ needs have been sacrificed for capital. 
In the findings chapter I noted that I sensed an amount of nostalgia from most of my respondents 
in their recollection of the past, as they constantly compared the past to the present, between 
periods when mines were run by the government and during the time they were in private hands. 
However, critics within Zambia, such as (Simutanyi, 2008) have noted that government 
ownership failed to translate into sustained benefits. According to this line of argument, the 
eventual collapse of mines was a result of the government‟s involvement in running them. And 
this is the reason why some saw privatisation as inevitable. However, from the point of view of 
my respondents privatisation has not improved livelihoods or created more job opportunities. 
And as Table 1 in the introduction suggests, employment has been reduced. Respondents also 
bemoaned the type of jobs on offer as they accused investors of out-sourcing most skilled jobs. 
They also argued that the amount of social investments such as health care and other social 
amenities has also reduced. While most respondents recognised the important role that copper 
mining could play to overall economic growth of the country, they argued that this was 
impossible to achieve as long as mining remained isolated from other sectors of the economy. 
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Some also saw this contribution as worthless as long as it did not translate into overall economic 
wellbeing for the majority. They criticised companies for not paying a fair share of taxes, and 
with siphoning out copper revenues with little or no multiplier effects locally. They also argued 
that investors disregarded the environment. Overall the view was that current mining patterns 
and practices were causing more harm than good especially to local communities. Thus, in order 
to ensure that mining benefited communities and companies equally, most respondents argued 
for a rebalancing of the status quo and for increased state participation in copper mining being 
the key pillar of the economy. Respondents were also of the view that the only way mining could 
be linked to the local economy was through nationalisation, or finding a balance between 
nationalisation and privatisation. According to my respondents by nationalising mines and the 
government becoming active participants in the mines they would be better placed to determine 
Zambia‟s developmental path and, indeed, their futures. However, although the government 
could indeed go some way to create the environment necessary for sustained economic benefits 
to accrue to the local people, in a global world it is difficult to fathom how a complete shift in 
policy nationalisation would be received by other players in the Zambian economy such as IFIs 
and donor countries. 
6.1. Recommendations for further research 
It is important to recognise the limitations of this study in terms of the majority of my 
respondents‟ age, gender, social background and educational level.  Further research would need 
to compare the views of these „privileged‟ young urban people on the verge of entering the job 
market and contrast them with other groups of people differently situated in social, economic and 
geographical aspects.  Among such groups would be those already in employment and indeed 
those – the majority of young people – who are unemployed.  Even though copper mining has 
generally been a male-dominated field, it would be interesting to do research that also looks at 
female perspectives of copper mining in development. As Zambia is endowed with many other 
mineral resources such as emeralds and rare earth metals, research needs to be done regarding 
how the country can develop a more sustainable mineral resource sector that goes beyond copper 
mining. Integrative ways that effectively link the development of these minerals to other sectors 
of the economy such as agriculture, tourism and manufacturing must be properly researched. 
Furthermore the extent to which company ownership affects the development of value chains 
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must be researched. At present it is very unclear how many Zambians own mining companies. 
More research that aims to recommend measures of how small scale miners could be helped to 
participate in this industry must be conducted. Analysing these issues would give a good 



























Adam, C. S. and Simpasa, A. M. 2010. The economics of the copper price boom in Zambia. In: 
Fraser, A. and Larmer, M. (eds) Zambia, mining, and neoliberalism: Boom and bust on 
the globalised Copperbelt.  Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.59-90. 
Arezki, R. Dupuy, A. and Gelb, A. 2012. Spend or send. Finance and Development.4 (49): 28-
31. 
Arsel, M. and Angel, N. A. 2012. “Stating” nature‟s role in Ecuadorian development: Civil 
society and the Yasuni-ITT initiative. Journal of Developing Societies. 28 (2): 203-227. 
BBC World Service. 2011. Does mining benefit Africa? 
Bebbington, A., Hinojosa, L., Bebbington, D. H., Burneo, M, L and Warnaars, X. 2008. 
Contention and ambiguity: Mining and the possibilities of development. Working Paper 
No 57. Brooks World Poverty Institute. University of Manchester. 
Bowen, G. A. 2008. Naturalistic inquiry and the saturation concept: a research note. Qualitative 
Research 8(1): 137-152. 
Bracking, S. forthcoming. How do investors value the environment? Financialisation of „natural 
resources‟ through private equity vehicles in secrecy jurisdictions. 
Braun, V. and Clarke, V. 2006. Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in 
Psychology. 3:77-101 
Breckenridge, K. 2008. Special rights in property: Why modern African economies are 
dependent on mineral resources. Working Paper No 62. Brooks World Poverty Institute. 
University of Manchester. 
Bush, R. 2007. Poverty and neoliberalism: Persistence and reproduction in the global south.    
London: Pluto Press. 
68 
 
Bush, R. 2010. Conclusion: Mining, dispossession, and transformation in Africa. In: Fraser, A. 
and Larmer, M. (eds) Zambia, mining, and neoliberalism: Boom and bust on the 
globalised Copperbelt. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.237-268. 
Cammack, P. 2002. Neoliberalism, the World Bank and the new politics of development. In: 
Kothari, M. and Minogue, M. (eds) Development theory and practice. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 157-190. 
Chitonge, H. 2010. Zambia‟s Development Agreements and the soaring copper prices. Southern 
African Resource Watch. Issue 11. University of Cape Town. 
Chambers, R. 1995. Poverty and livelihoods; Whose reality counts? Environment and 
Urbanisation 7:173-204. 
Collier, P. 2008. The Bottom Billion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cooper, F. 2002. Africa since 1940: The past of the present. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Creswell, J. W. and Miller, D. L. 2010. Determining validity in qualitative inquiry. Theory into 
Practice. 39 (3): 124-130. 
Dambwizi, D. 2009. Sustainable development in Zambia: Experiences and ways forward. United 
Nations Biodiplomacy Initiative. 
Dymond, A., Lambrechts, K., and Chase, S. 2007. Undermining development? Copper mining in 
Zambia. Action for Southern Africa, Christian Aid and Scotland’s Aid Agency. 
Earthworks and Oxfam America .2004. Dirty metals: mining, communities and the environment.  
Erdman, G. and Simutanyi, N. 2003. Transition in Zambia: The hybridisation of the Third 
Republic. Conrad Adenauer Foundation. Occasional Papers. 
Ferguson, J. 1999. Expectations of modernity: myths and meanings of urban life on the Zambian 
Copperbelt. London: University of California Press. 
69 
 
Ferguson, J. 2007. Global Shadows: Africa in the neoliberal world order. Durham NC: Duke 
University Press. 
Fessehaie, J. 2012. What determines the breadth and width of Zambia‟s backward linkages to 
copper mining? The role of public policy and value chain dynamics. Resources policy. 
University of Cape Town.1-9.   
Fokwang, J. 2006. Ambiguous transitions: Mediating citizenships among youth in Cameroon. In: 
Beckman, B. and Adeoti, G. Intellectuals and African development. Dakar: Codesria  
Fraser, A. 2010. Introduction: Boom and bust on the Zambian Copperbelt. In: Fraser, A. and 
Larmer, M. (eds) Zambia, mining, and neoliberalism: Boom and bust on the globalised 
Copperbelt.  Palgrave Macmillan. 1-30. 
Fraser, A. and Lungu, J. 2006. For whom the windfalls? Winners and losers in the privatisation 
of Zambia‟s copper mines. Mine Watch Zambia. 
Gewald, J. 2008. An economic history of the Zambian Copperbelt. The Journal of African 
History 49: 489-491. 
Gewald, J. and Soeters, S. 2010. African miners and shape shifting capital flight. In: Fraser, A. 
and Larmer, M. (eds) Zambia, mining, and neoliberalism: boom and bust on the 
globalised Copperbelt. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.155-183. 
Green, D. 2009. A copper-bottomed crisis? The impact of the global economic meltdown on 
Zambia.  Oxfam International. 
Greig, A. Hulme, D. and Turner, M. 2007. Challenging global inequality development: theory 
and practice in the 21st Century. London and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Guba, E.G. and Lincoln, S.Y. 1994. Competing pradigms in qualitative research. In: Denzian ,N. 




Gylfason, T. 2001. Nature, power and growth. The Scottish Journal of Political Economy. 48 (5): 
558-587.  
Hamann, R. 2003. Mining companies‟ role in sustainable development: The „why‟ and „how‟ of 
social responsibility from a business perspective. Development Southern Africa. 20 (2): 
237-254.    
Hammersley, R. 1993. Minerals planning and sustainability. The Town Planning Review. 64 (4): 
xiii-xvi. 
Hansen, K, T. 2005. Getting stuck in the compound: Some odds against social adulthood in 
Lusaka, Zambia. Africa Today. 51 (4):3-16. Indiana Univeristy Press 
Harvey, D. 2010 The enigma of capital and the crisis of capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Henry, G. 1998 Practical sampling. In Bickman, L. and Rog, D. (eds.) Handbook of Social 
Science Methods. Thousand Oaks:Sage 
Hogenboom, B. 2012. Depoliticised and repoliticised minerals in Latin America. Journal of 
Developing Societies. 28 (2):133-158.  
Huckle, J. 1996. Realising sustainability in changing times In: Huckle, J. and Sterling, S. (eds.) 
Education for sustainability. Earthscan Publications. 
International Council on Mining and Metals. 2012. The role of mining in national economies. 
www.icmm.com 
Jenkins, H. and Yakovleva, N. 2006. Corporate social responsibility in the mining industry: 
Exploring trends in social and environmental disclosure. Journal of Cleaner Production. 
14: 271-284. 
Kalinda, B. and Floro, M. 1992. Zambia in the 1980s: A review of national and urban level 
economic reforms. Working Paper. 
71 
 
Kapelus, P. 2002. Mining, corporate social responsibility and the “Community”: the case of 
RioTinto, Richard Bay minerals and the Mbonambi Community. Journal of Business 
Ethics (39) 275-296. 
Kothari, U. and Minogue, M. 2002. Critical perspectives on development. In: Kothari, M. and 
Minogue, M. (eds) Development theory and practice. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
1-15. 
Kvale, S. 1996. Interviews: An introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing. London: Sage 
Publications. 
Langmeand, P and Baker, G. 2006. Sectoral study of the effective tax burden. In:  Langmead, P. 
Baker, G. Harding, A. and Mumbwatasai, M. (eds) Tax policy issues in Zambia. 
Langmead and Baker. 
Larmer, M. 2010. A historical perspective on Zambia‟s mining booms and busts. In: Fraser, A. 
and Larmer, M. (eds) Zambia, mining, and neoliberalism: Boom and bust on the 
globalised Copperbelt. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.31-58. 
Lee, R. 2012. Zambian mining revolution? Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa. 
http://www.osisa.org 
Lehtonen, M. 2004. The Environmental social interface of sustainable development: Capabilities, 
social capital, institutions. Ecological Economics. 49:199-214. 
Matti, S. 2010. Resources and rent seeking in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Third World 
Quarterly. 31(3): 401-413. 
Minoughue, M. and Khotari, K. 2002. Conclusion: Orthodoxy and its alternatives in 
contemporary development. In: Kothari, M. and Minogue, M. (eds) Development theory 
and practice. Palgrave. 179-190. 
Moyo, D. 2009. Dead Aid. London: Penguin. 
72 
 
Mususa, P. 2010. Contesting illegality: Women in the informal copper business. In: Fraser, A. 
and Larmer, M. (eds) Zambia, mining, and neoliberalism: Boom and bust on the 
globalised Copperbelt. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 185-208. 
Mutasa, C. 2007. The Impact of structural adjustment programs in Zambia. Afrodad. 
Mwanakatwe, J. M. 1968. The Growth of Education in Zambia since Independence. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Nyambe, I. and Kawamya, V. 2005. Approaches to sustainable mineral development in Zambia. 
Geological Society. London: Special Publications. 250: 73-86.  
Nyamnjoh, J. 2000. Globalisation and popular disenchantment in Africa. African Sociological 
Review. 4 (2): 1-45. 
Peet, R. and Watts, M. 2004. Liberation ecology: Development, sustainability and environment 
in an age of market triumphalism In: Peet, R. and Watts, M. (eds) Liberation ecologies: 
Environment, development, social movements. London: Routledge. 1-45. 
Robson, C. 1993. Real world research: A resource for social scientists and practitioner-
researchers. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Rowden, R. 2011. Poverty reduction is not development. Review of African Political Economy. 
37(126): 503-516. 
Sachs, J. 2005. The End of Poverty. London: Penguin Books. 
Sachs, J. D. and Warner, A. M. 1997. Natural resource abundance and economic growth. Centre 
for International Development and Harvard Institute for International Development. 
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.  
Scoones, I. 2009. Livelihoods‟ perspectives and rural development. Journal of Peasant Studies 
36 (1): 171-196. 
73 
 
Simutanyi, N. 2008. Copper mining in Zambia: The developmental legacy of privatisation. Paper 
No 165. Institute for Security Studies. Pretoria 
Singh, J. T. N. 2012. Who owns the minerals? Repoliticising neoliberal governance in Brazil and 
Chile. Journal of Developing Societies. 28 (2): 229-256. 
Stephens, M. 2012. Zambia extractive industries transparency initiative. Independent 
reconciliation report for the year 2009. 
Stevens, P. 2003. Resource impact curse or blessing? A literature survey. Centre for Energy, 
Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy. 
Stiglitz, J. 2002. Globalisation and its discontents. London: Penguin. 
Thornton, I. 1996. Impacts of mining on the environment: Some local, regional and global issues. Applied 
Geochemistry. (11): 355-361. 
Turner, D. W. 2010. Qualitative interview design: A practical guide for novice investigators. The 
Qualitative Report. 15 (3): 754-760. 
Van Donge, J.K. 2009. The plundering of Zambian resources by Fredrick Chiluba and his 
friends: A case study of the interaction between national politics and the international 
drive towards good governance. African Affairs 108 (430): 69-90. 
Woodhouse, P. 2002. Development policies and environmental agendas In: Khotari, U. and 
Minogue, M. (eds) Development theory and practice. London and Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
136-156. 
World Economic Forum. 2010. Responsible mineral development initiative. Research Report. 
World Bank.  2003. Data and statistics. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/zambia 
Zambian Traveler. 2011. Issue 65. 
 
 
74 
 
 
